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Abstract
We analyze a variant of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking in which savers can
use a bank to invest in a risky project operated by an entrepreneur. The savers can buy equity
in the bank and save via deposits. The bank chooses to invest in a safe asset or to fund the
entrepreneur. The bank and the entrepreneur face limited liability and there is a probability
of a run which is governed by the bank’s leverage and its mix of safe and risky assets. The
possibility of the run reduces the incentive to lend and take risk, while limited liability pushes
for excessive lending and risk-taking. We explore how capital regulation, liquidity regulation,
deposit insurance, loan to value limits, and dividend taxes interact to offset these frictions.
We compare agents welfare in the decentralized equilibrium absent regulation with welfare in
equilibria that prevail with various regulations that are optimally chosen. In general, regulation
can lead to Pareto improvements but fully correcting both distortions requires more than one
regulation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we expand the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking in five ways to make it
conducive to exploring various macroprudential regulations that have been discussed in the wake of
the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The first change is to introduce 3 types of agents: savers,
bankers, and entrepreneurs. A second change is that the entrepreneurs operate a risky technology.
The third change is that savers face a portfolio decision in which they can directly invest in a safe
asset or invest in the bank in the form of either deposits or equity. Fourth, we posit that banks
and the entrepreneurs are subject to limited liability. Finally, we modify the model in the spirit of
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) so that whether or not a run occurs is tied to the funding structure and
lending choices of the bank.
These modifications mean that banks play three roles in the economy. First, they help provide
liquidity insurance for savers. Second, they improve the risk sharing opportunities for savers (rel-
ative to the case where direct lending to borrowers was required). Third, because of the better risk
sharing, they expand the amount of funding available to borrowers. These are the three leading
functions that various theories suppose that banks play.
Furthermore, the model not only succinctly nests competing visions of the causes of the GFC,
but also can be used to explore potential regulatory tools that are currently being proposed to prevent
future crises. In particular, Admati and Hellwig (2013) and many other observers argue that the GFC
was largely due to excessive risk-taking by under-capitalized banks which were exploiting taxpayer
support. The limited liability assumption combined with the option for entrepreneurs to invest in a
risky technology insures that this force is present in the model. In isolation, these features will lead
to over-investment and excessive risk-taking.
A second view, reflected in the French et al. (2010) and elsewhere, holds that the central problem
exposed by the GFC was funding vulnerabilities in the financial system and that runs debilitated the
ability of the financial system to intermediate. The Diamond-Dybvig framework is designed to study
this possibility. The fact that savers may demand their money back before loans would normally be
repaid makes banks cautious in their lending. If a run does occur it is destructive because loans must
be recalled to service deposits and both savers, who may not be repaid, and borrowers are worse off.
This aspect of the model creates a force for under-investment (or equivalently too little lending).
By giving savers and the banks a portfolio choice the model is suitable for studying many types
of regulations including capital regulation, liquidity regulation, deposit insurance, loan to value
limits, and dividend taxes. Because we do a full general equilibrium analysis in which agents
choose when to default and when to run on the bank, we can study not only the direct effects that
result from these regulations, but also those that arise through general equilibrium price effects.
We reach three main conclusions from analyzing a calibrated version of this model. First, when
a run occurs it is sufficiently debilitating that preventing it via regulation can lead all agents in the
model to be better off than in a decentralized equilibrium with no regulation. In other words, the
decentralized (or equivalently competitive) equilibrium in the model is constrained Pareto inefficient
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and can be improved upon by various regulatory interventions.1
In the analysis we compare the decentralized allocations to two types of other equilibria. One in-
volves a central planner who can directly choose allocations and internalizes all general equilibrium
effects, but is constrained by the existing market structure. We call this the second best benchmark
and in computing it we do not worry about how the planner would have to decentralize the solution.
We also study other equilibria where a planner allows agents to choose allocations, but inter-
venes by imposing limits on certain quantities (e.g. bank capital ratios) or prices (e.g. a dividend
tax) to affect the agents’ marginal decisions. We dub these equilibria "dual planning" outcomes.
The more precise statement of the first result is that Pareto improvements over the competitive
equilibrium are possible even if the planner considers only dual planning outcomes.
In the original Diamond-Dybvig model a bank run occurs randomly. We assume instead that
when the bank substitutes equity financing for deposit financing it lowers the risk of a run. Similarly,
when it holds more of the safe asset and makes few loans it lowers the risk of a run. Our assumptions
are consistent with the analysis of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) variant of the Diamond-Dybvig
model.
Our second result is that various regulatory tools can alleviate the run risk in very different
ways because once a regulation is imposed the bank and savers will endogenously alter their other
portfolio choices. For instance, raising capital requirements forces the bank to adjust deposit interest
rates to attract more equity funding (and less deposit funding) from the savers. On its own this
change will lower the risk of a run. But, in response the bank may choose to take more risk on
the asset side of its balance sheet by reducing its holding of safe assets and making more loans.
Deposit insurance always creates an incentive to do more lending. So it is possible that regulations
that moderate the risk of a run exacerbate the problems caused by limited liability.
The last result is that once a single regulatory tool has been used to alleviate the risk of a
run, further Pareto improvements are not possible. The problem comes because the entrepreneurs
naturally want to take more risk to exploit the protection of limited liability. Once the entrepreneurs
no longer worry that the run risk is present, there are no further interventions that can improve
their welfare. Hence, additional regulation only makes sense to impose because of the desire to
redistribute income.
Depending on how a social planner compares the importance of the bankers, savers and en-
trepreneurs additional regulation may or may not be attractive. A corollary to this conclusion is that
whether or not optimal regulation lowers or raises investment also depends on the planner’s weights
on the different agents. We characterize the combinations of regulations that can be used to most
1In a model with Diamond-Dybvig preferences and complete asset markets for aggregate risk, Allen and Gale (2004)
show that equilibrium allocations under financial intermediation are constrained efficient. In our framework, the presence
of incomplete markets and limited liability makes the capital structure of banks matter for equilibrium outcomes and
bank-run risk. The optimality conditions of a constrained planner will differ from those in the competitive economy and
welfare improvements are possible. See Stiglitz (1982), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Citana et al. (1998)
for a discussion and rigorous proof of constrained Pareto suboptimality. See Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) for a
related model in which banks play all three roles that we posit, but note that they do not allow for limited liability and
bank-runs which will be important in our set up.
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closely mimic the dual planning allocations.
The remainder of the paper is separated into five parts. Section 2 introduces the basic model and
solves for optimal lending and investment decisions for the saver, the banker and the entrepreneur.
Section 3 derives the optimization problem of the constrained social planner, and compares the com-
petitive allocations to the second best solution. Section 4 studies the how various macroprudential
regulations change the decisions of the bank, the entrepreneur and the saver, and compare optimal
dual planning outcomes to the second best. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We start by describing the basic structure of the model and then turn to the precise solution of the
agents optimal choices. We consider an economy which lasts for three periods, t = 1,2,3 and is
populated by a continuum of three types of agents, entrepreneurs P, savers R and bankers B. All
agents are endowed with a perishable good in the first period, and receive a second such endowment
in either the second or third periods depending on their type. All agents are risk-averse.
In period 1, P decides how much of his endowment to consume or to invest in a risky project.
The project matures in period 3 and delivers an uncertain payoff. There are S states of the world and
the true state is revealed in the beginning of the third period. P can also borrow from B in order to
invest. P exclusively owns the rights to the risky project, which requires his special skills to operate
the technology and produce output. In other words, R and B can only access the technology by
lending to P. We assume that P can only borrow through simple, non-contingent, non-recourse debt
contracts. We will show that in general P will not want to issue equity claims. Apart from the risky
project, there is also a riskless asset in the economy, which is in perfectly elastic supply and its yield
is normalized to zero.
While loans will not be indexed to the state of the world, they will be collateralized by the
total output of the risky project. If the value of the output is higher than the contractually promised
repayment, then P honors his obligation. But, P will default on his loan when the value of output is
lower than the contractually promised repayment and creditors will seize the project’s output.
P does not want consume in period 2. In period 3, he consumes his (new) endowment plus what
remains from the project’s output after repaying (or defaulting on) his loan. In the event of default,
limited liability allows P to consume all of his endowment.
In period 1, R decides how much to consume and how to allocate his remaining endowment be-
tween investing in the riskless asset, or making an equity investment or deposit in a bank. In period
2, each agent R receives an additional endowment and learns his type (which is private information
and thus non-contractible): With probability δ the agent is impatient and with probability 1−δ he is
patient. R′s types are i.i.d. and the law of large numbers means that the aggregate total of impatient
savers can be perfectly predicted. Impatient savers can consume only in periods 1 and 2, while
patient ones consume in periods 1 and 3. As in Diamond and Dybvig, banks facilitate risk-sharing
by offering demand-deposit contracts, which will be specified below.
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We depart from Diamond and Dybvig by allowing for aggregate uncertainty in period 3. Numer-
ous papers, for example Allen and Gale (2004), Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005), model aggregate uncertainty in the Diamond-Dybvig model. We differ from these papers be-
cause we assume incomplete asset markets for aggregate risk and we allow banks to fund themselves
with both debt and equity. Since entrepreneurs sometimes default, loans are risky and splitting the
risk between deposits and equity allows agents to partially hedge this risk.2 To simplify the pre-
sentation of the results while preserving market incompleteness, we will consider only three states
of the world in the third period of the model. These will be calibrated in our numerical analysis to
cover the three interesting economic cases. One state features full repayment, the second involves
a partial default, while in the third the bank fails. Allowing for more possible outcomes will not
overturn the fundamental insights from the simplified model.
B is a banker, who in addition to her period 1 endowment, owns a financial intermediary with
some initial capital. She can raise additional equity or accept deposits from R. The initial equity
inside the bank cannot be used for first period consumption. The bank’s shareholders are protected
by limited liability. Dividends on equity are paid pro-rata after deposits have been fully repaid.
Otherwise, bankruptcy occurs, equity holders receive nothing and the salvage value of the bank’s
assets are distributed pro-rata to depositors. The banker is assumed to make two separate decisions,
with one side of her brain she manages the assets of the bank, and the other side decides what to do
with her endowment, which she can invest as additional equity or deposits in the bank or consume
in period 1.3 Like P, B always prefers to consume in period 3.
The bank offers different interest rates on early and late deposit withdrawals, denoted by rD2 and
rD3 , respectively, where r
D
2 < r
D
3 . Impatient savers will withdraw their deposits in period 2, while
the bank will set rD2 so that patient ones have an incentive to wait until period 3. We assume that
the loan, I, to entrepreneurs can be called at t = 2 subject to a liquidation cost 1− ξ per unit of
lending. We parametrise ξ such that early liquidation is inefficient and the bank would rather invest
in enough liquid assets in period 1, LIQ1, to service the expected the expected level of withdrawals
by impatient depositors. If the bank cannot fully serve early deposit withdrawals, shareholders are
wiped-out, the bank’s assets are liquidated and distributed to the depositors that decided to withdraw
early given a sequential service constraint. Thus, there is an endogenous demand for holding the
liquid asset.
The sequential service constraint can also give rise to a bank-run equilibrium where all patient
savers decide to withdraw early. A bank run can occur if the liquidation value of the bank, LIQ1+
ξ · I is lower than the total deposits outstanding in period 2, DR(1+ rD2 ), which can only happen if ξ
is sufficiently low or if rD2 is sufficiently high; notice that if ξ = 1 and r
D
2 = 0 the value of the total
assets is always higher than outstanding deposits because of the bank’s equity. Thus, rD2 > 0 is not
2See Benston and Smith (1976) and Allen and Gale (1997) for models that rationalize this role for banks.
3The model allows for the possibility that B deposits some of her initial endowment in the bank as well. B always
waits until period 3 to withdraw her deposits. For simplicity of exposition, we consider a calibrated example where B is
not wealthy enough in period 1 to want to invest in deposits or hold any liquid assets, which reduces her role to managing
the bank.
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a sufficient condition for the existence of bank-run equilibria and we require liquidation costs to be
positive contrary to Diamond and Dybvig (1983).4
As in Diamond and Dybvig, bank-runs in our model are panic based rather than purely infor-
mation based as in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen and Gale
(1998) and Uhlig (2010). In other words, a bank-run can occur due to a coordination problem
among depositors even if the bank is solvent in the long-run. In determining the optimal ex-ante
decisions, it is important to know what determines panics. In the Diamond-Dybvig model panics
happen purely by chance. Cooper and Ross (1998) suppose instead that with exogenous probability
q there is a wave of economy-wide pessimism which governs whether a panic occurs (Peck and
Shell (2003) assume that the probability of a bank-run is driven by sunspots; Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2013) model it as an autoregressive process). We modify the Cooper and Ross assumption so that
q is a function of the balance sheet structure of the bank.
We use a functional form for the probability of a bank-run which is an approximation of the
solution in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who use global games methods to resolve the multiplicity
of equilibria.5 In particular, we suppose that the probability of a bank-run is given by
q=
(
max
[
1− LIQ1+ξ · I
DR(1+ rD2 )
,0
])2
. (1)
This formulation has several appealing properties. First, as in Goldstein and Pauzner, a run becomes
more likely when individual depositors become less likely to be fully repaid during a run. Second,
when the liquidation value of the bank, LIQ1+ξ · I, exceeds the promised gross delivery on demand
deposits, DR(1+ rD2 ), a run never occurs. Hence, regulation that tries to set q = 0 can do so by
insuring that this condition holds without worrying about the functional form of q. Third, the
probability of a bank run is decreasing in the bank’s liquidity and capital positions, since
LIQ1+ξ · I
DR(1+ rD2 )
can be written as
LR+ξ
(1+LR−CR)(1+ rD2 )
, where LR= LIQ1/I is a liquidity ratio,CR= EQ/I is the
capital adequacy ratio, and EQ= I+LIQ1−DR is the total equity capital of the bank.
Figure 1 below summarizes the interactions in the model.
4In a more elaborate model, the bank would securitize a part of its risky loans to obtain liquidity and ξ would be the
price that outside investors would be willing to pay for them. In the presence of other frictions, cash-in-market price may
prevail and a fire-sales spiral would reduce ξ further.
5In an online Appendix we adjust our framework such that depositors receive private noise signals at t = 2 regarding
the probability of the state of the world and solve for the threshold equilibrium as in Morris and Shin (1998). The
probability of a bank-run is a function of (LIQ1 +ξ · I)/(DR(1+rD2 )) and the consumption levels of patient and impatient
depositors. Rochet and Vives (2004) delegate the decision to run to fund manager who have a simpler objective and study
the ability of a lender of last resort to mitigate the adverse effects of bank-runs. See also Postlewaite and Vives (1987) for
an early attempt to endogenize runs.
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Figure 1: Timeline
2.1 Entrepreneur P’s problem
P wants to maximize his intertemporal expected utility from consumption, formally
maxU¯P =UP
(
cP1
)
+q ·∑
s
ω3sUP
(
cP,run3s
)
+(1−q)
[
∑
s
ω3sUP
(
cP,no-run3s
)]
(2)
subject to the following constraints (where the associated Lagrange multipliers on the constraints
are shown in parentheses):
cP1 + I
P ≤ eP1 (λP1 ), (3)
and
cP,no-run3s ≤max
[
A3sF
(
I+ IP
)− I(1+ rI),0]+ eP3s (λP,no-run3s ) (4)
and
cP,run3s ≤ ξ · IP+ eP3s (λP,run3s ) (5)
where ω3s is the probability of state s∈ {g,m,b} occurring at t=3, and cP1 , eP1 , cP,no-run3s , cP,run3s and eP3s,
are the levels of consumption and endowment in period 1 and state s in period 3 respectively. P funds
the project using IP from his endowment and by borrowing an additional amount, I, from the bank
at an interest rate rI . A3s is the uncertain productivity shock. We specialize the production function
to be F =
(
I+ IP
)a
`1−a =
(
I+ IP
)a
, with a ≤ 1 and entrepreneurial skills’ supply normalized to
7
`= 1.6
If a bank-run occurs, then P′s investment is liquidated, and he receives the liquidation value of
his capital contribution, ξ · IP, as shown in budget constraint (5).7 The optimal choice of consump-
tion implies that λP1 =U
P ′(cP1 ), λ
P,no-run
3s =(1−q)·ω3sUP
′
(cP,no-run3s ), and λ
P,run
3s = q ·ω3sUP
′
(cP,run3s ).
It is convenient to define the percentage repayment on the loan by V I3s = min
[
1,
A3sF(
(
I+ IP
)
I(1+ rI)
]
.
We choose the productivity levels, A3s, such that V I3g = 1 and 0 < V
I
2b < V
I
2m < 1. In words, this
means that the bank loan is fully repaid in the good state, and only a partial repayment is made in
the other two states, with a larger default in the bad state than the medium state.
To build intuition, provisionally assume that IP = 0 (and we will verify that this will indeed be
true). Importantly, when P defaults the lender seizes all the output from the project. The lenders will
anticipate this possibility and will account for that in choosing the interest rate on loans. But from
P′s perspective this interest rate is taken as given and P will make his investment decision expecting
to repay only in the good state of the nature. Thus, the optimal level of I satisfies,
1+ rI = aA3gIa−1 (6)
Substituting this result into the definition of V I3s further implies that,
V I3s = min
[
1,
1
a
A3s
A3g
]
(7)
For the equilibria studied in the rest of the paper, we show, in proposition 3 in the appendix, that P
will not issue equity claims in equilibrium. Loosely speaking, this happens because issuing equity
would reduce the payoffs to P in the good state in exchange for having to borrow less. But, P is
already not paying anything back to the bank in the other states of nature so this kind of transaction
is not attractive to P.
Finally, provided that P has relatively limited resources it would be natural to expect he will
also not invest further in his project. Technically, IP = 0 requires
λP1 > aA3gI
a−1λP,no-run3g +ξ ·∑
s
λP,run3s
⇒ u′ (eP1)> a · (1−q) ·ω3gUP′ (eP3g+(1−a)A3gIa)A3gIa−1+ξ ·q ·∑
s
ω3sUP
′ (
eP3s
)
(8)
In the calibrations we consider ep1 is always low enough to satisfy inequality (8).
6Note that for a = 1, P′s skills are not required to run the project and B can invest directly in it. In this is a special
case, the return to lending will be constant.
7This amounts to assuming that when the loan is called, the project is terminated and its resale value is much lower
than if it could be continued. Our specification assumes that the contribution of the entrepreneur, IP, is also liquidated in a
run. We could have extended the model to introduce interim liquidity shocks to the entrepreneur, who would require new
funding, as in Fahri and Tirole (2012) in order to better justify this modelling choice. However, this would not materially
change our analysis, so we abstract from it.
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Another implication of the limited liability for P is that his third period consumption is limited
to his endowment whenever he defaults. The only force in the model that limits the incentive to
invest as much as possible is the interest rate set by lenders. When the bank is lending, the bank also
faces limited liability on its deposits so the interest rate will not fully limit the incentive to gamble.
2.2 Household R’s problem
R wants to maximize his expected utility taking into consideration that he will be impatient with
probability δ and that a bank-run will occur with probability q. In a bank-run, all households will
try to get their money out of the bank irrespective of their true type. It is helpful to recognize that any
particular saver contemplates four possible outcomes when allocating his savings. He could turn out
to be impatient and be fully repaid on deposits, he could patient and not have a run occur, or he could
get paid or not irrespective of his type in a bank-run. We define the probability that an individual
household will be served in full to be θ=min
[
LIQ1+ξ · I
(DR+DB)(1+ rD2 )
,1
]
. If a run occurs consumption
will be cR,run,paid2/3 (where patient households carry over their income to consume in period 3 using the
liquid asset). With probability 1−θ, R will receive zero repayment on his deposits conditional on
a run occurring, and his consumption, cR,run,unpaid2/3 will solely consist of his additional endowment
eR2 and any liquidity holdings carried over from period 1. Alternatively, with probability 1− q a
bank-run does not take place. In this case, with probability δ, R consumes early, cR,i,no-run2 , and with
probability 1−δ, he consumes late, cR,p,no-run3s , after uncertainty has realized in period 3. Formally,
R wants to maximize
U¯R =UR
(
cR1
)
+q
[
θ ·UR
(
cR,run,paid2/3
)
+(1−θ)UR
(
cR,run,unpaid2/3
)]
+(1−q)
[
δ ·UR
(
cR,i,no-run2
)
+(1−δ) ·∑
s
ω3sUR
(
cR,p,no-run3s
)]
(9)
subject to the budget constraint in each point in time.
In period 1 savers make identical decisions regarding how to allocate their endowment between
consumption, deposits, bank equity and liquid asset holdings:
cR1 +P
R
eqx
R
eq+D
R+LIQR1 ≤ eR1 (λR1 ) (10)
where xReq is the number of bank equity shares he buys and D
R are his deposits. PReq is the price per
share that R is willing to pay to purchase equity. LIQR1 is the investment in a safe/liquid asset with
zero yield. This asset is assumed to be in perfectly elastic supply and is akin to a storage technology.
In period 2, each household learns his type. If a bank run does not take place, impatient house-
holds withdraw their deposits and sell the equity they hold in a secondary market at the price of Psec.8
8Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) also consider the choice between non traded deposits and traded equity. In their
framework, only one of the two will be traded in equilibrium, while in our economy there will be an endogenous debt
to equity ratio because savers would like to use both assets to insure against aggregate uncertainty in the final period.
Moreover, their model differs ours because they assume limited convertibility of deposits, zero liquidation value for the
9
They may be holding a liquid asset bought in period 1 and they receive an additional endowment,
thus
cR,i,no-run2 ≤ (1+ rD2 )DR+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2 (λR,i,no-run2 ) (11)
Absent a bank run, patient households prefer to wait and withdraw their deposits in period 3.
Equation (35) below shows the incentive compatibility constraint such that patient depositors report
their true type. They may decide to buy or sell equity in the secondary market and they determine
how much of the liquid asset, LIQR2 , to carry over to period 3. They fund the purchase of additional
equity, xRsec, and new liquid assets with the existing liquid assets carried over from period 1 and the
additional endowment they receive, i.e.,
PsecxRsec+LIQ
R
2 ≤ LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2 (λR,p,no-run2 ) (12)
Finally, once uncertainty is realized, patient households receive dividends per share of DPS3s
and have their deposits repaid in full when the bank is solvent. When the bank is insolvent with
probability 1, which is the case in state 3b, it is liquidated and the salvage value of the bank’s assets
are distributed pro-rata to depositors. Letting VD3s ∈ [0,1] be the percentage repayment on period 3
deposit withdrawals, which we define later, implies that consumption will be:
cR,p,no-run3s ≤ xRsecDPS3s+VD3sDR(1+ rD3 )+LIQR2 (λR,p,no-run3s ) (13)
If there is a bank run then equity holdings are worthless, i.e. Psec = 0. Some households will
receive their deposit in full and their consumption is given by
cR,run,paid2/3 ≤ (1+ rD2 )DR+LIQR1 + eR2 (λR,run,paid2 ) (14)
while the rest will lose their deposits and consume only out of their liquid holdings and their en-
dowment, i.e.,
cR,run,unpaid2/3 ≤ LIQR1 + eR2 (λR,run,unpaid2 ) (15)
Optimal consumption choices imply that λR1 =U
R ′(cR1 ), λ
R,i,no-run
2 = (1− q)δUR
′
(cR,i,no-run2 ),
λR,run,paid2 = q ·θ ·UR
′
(cR,run,paid2 ), λ
R,run,unpaid
2 = q(1−θ)UR
′
(cR,run,unpaid2 ) and λ
R,p,no-run
3s = (1−
q)(1−δ) ·ω3sUR ′(cR,p,no-run3s ).
Given our interests in regulation, it is important to understand how savers decide between saving
via deposits versus equity. The optimality conditions for investment in deposits and bank equity are:
−λR1 +
(
λR,i,no-run2 +λ
R,run,paid
2
)
(1+ rD2 )+∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s V
D
3s(1+ r
D
3 ) = 0 (16)
and
−λR1PReq+
(
λR,i,no-run2 +λ
R,p,no-run
2
)
Psec = 0 (17)
long-run investment and smooth preference over period 2 and 3 consumption. Our model more closely follows Diamond
and Dybvig in these respects.
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Both of these conditions are intuitive. Equation (16) balances the cost of forgoing consumption
in the first period against the benefits of investing in demand deposits that provide insurance against
the idiosyncratic liquidity shock in the intermediate period as well as the promise of higher (risky)
payoff in the long-run if they are not withdrawn early. Equation (17) trades off the cost of forgoing
consumption in the first period in order to buy bank equity at a price PReq which can be sold in the
secondary market for Psec if a bank-run does not occur. If depositors run on the bank Psec= 0. So the
desire to invest in equity depends on the expected return on holding equity,
Psec
PReq
, which is discussed
below.
The other period 1 choice for R is to invest in the riskless asset, LIQR1 . The optimality condition
for this choice is
−λR1 +λR,i,no-run2 +λR,p,no-run2 +λR,run,paid2 +λR,run,unpaid2 ≤ 0, (18)
which holds with inequality when LIQR1 = 0. This condition simply says the opportunity cost of
holding the liquid asset is the forgone consumption in period 1 and those resources can be stored
and then turned into a lottery on consumption in the second or third period.
In the second period, if a bank-run does not occur, impatient households consume using their
liquid assets, deposits, sales of their equity and their new endowment. The patient households
adjust their liquid assets and equity holdings to facilitate consumption in the third period (constraint
(12)). The optimality conditions for the liquid asset and equity holdings by patient households in
the second period are:
−λR,p,no-run2 +∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s = 0 (19)
and
−λR,p,no-run2 Psec+∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s DPS3s = 0. (20)
We can now fully characterize R′s portfolio decisions. Equations (17) and (18) imply that R will in-
vest in banking equity in the first period only if Psec, given by the discounted sum of future dividends
(equation (20)), is higher than PReq. Otherwise he will prefer to hold the liquid asset.
In choosing between investing in the liquid asset or demand deposits in the first period, he
assesses the benefits of the partial liquidity insurance in the event of a bank-run that come with
deposits, along with their promise of a higher return in the third period, against the certain insurance
of the liquid asset. The trade-off can been seen by setting rD2 = 0 and combining equations (16), (19)
and (18).9 R will not invest in the liquid asset at t=1 if λR,p,run2 <∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s
[
VD3s(1+ r
D
3 )−1
]
, i.e.
if the marginal value of foregone consumption in the third period is higher than the marginal value
of higher consumption when R is unlucky and loses all his deposits due to a bank-run.
Finally, constraint (13) says that third period consumption for patient households must be funded
from the endowment and returns from the equity, deposits and liquid investments. R would choose
9Positive rD2 for early withdrawals renders deposits more attractive to insure against liquidity shocks. We discuss how
rD2 is chosen by the bank in section 2.3.
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to invest in both deposits and equity to better smooth consumption across the different states of the
world in the third period, thus the capital structure of the bank matters for real outcomes.10
2.3 Banker B’s problem
The banker begins period 1 with an initial endowment, eB1 , and her ownership in a bank, which we
assume she is not able to sell (or sell short). The (exogenously given) initial capital, EtotalB, is
equally divided among EB shares with a normalized price of 1. B manages the bank and chooses
how to invest its funds.
We allow B to decide how much of her own initial wealth to invest in additional equity and
deposits in the bank, xBeq and D
B, respectively. The additional equity and deposits that B raises from
R are denoted by xReq and D
R. B issues additional equity at the price of PBeq per share. The bank’s
assets are divided between a risky loan, denoted by I, that is made to P and a liquid (safe) asset,
LIQ1.
B considers the possibility of a bank run both when she invests her own wealth and in managing
the bank, thus wants to maximize her intertemporal expected utility, i.e.,
maxU¯B =UB
(
cB1
)
+(1−q)
[
∑
s
ω3sUB3s
(
cB,no-run3s
)]
+q ·
[
θ∑
s
ω3sUB
(
cB,run,paid3s
)
+(1−θ)∑
s
ω3sUB
(
cB,run,unpaid3s
)]
(21)
First, B decides how to allocate the portion of her wealth which is not trapped as banking equity.
This implies
cB1 +P
B
eqx
B
eq+D
B+LIQB1 ≤ eB1 (λB1 ) (22)
Separately, B decides how to how to allocate the equity and deposits raised by the bank between the
risky loan and the liquid asset, i.e.,
I+LIQ1 ≤ PBeqxBeq+DB+PBeqxReq+DR+EB (ψB1 ) (23)
It is simpler to separately analyze the cases where the bank-run does and does not occur. If a bank-
10It is not very surprising that with the kind of market incompleteness that holds in this model that capital structure
choices would have consequences for the agents behavior. Financial intermediation helps with the two sources of market
incompleteness: uninsurable idiosyncratic risk due to the preference shock in the intermediate period, and uninsurable
aggregate risk in the final period due to the fact that there are not enough assets to hedge completely the productivity
shocks. The capital structure of the bank would be irrelevant and the Modigliani-Miller result would hold, if aggregation
of R and B into one composite saver was possible. In turn, this would imply that both agents price debt, equity and the
risky investment the same way, and that they both have HARA utilities with the same risk tolerance given that markers are
incomplete (see Rubinstein (1974), Detemple and Gottardi (1998) for a formal analysis). In our calibration we use CRRA
utilities for all agents with the same risk-aversion. The reason that Modigliani-Miller fails is that R and B price contracts
differently. For example, R cares about early consumption as well as the repayment in the bankruptcy state 3b when he
decides how many deposits to hold, while B does not because she is both patient and protected by limited liability, as will
be shown in the following section. It is easy to show that for δ = 0, VD3b = 1, x
R
eq > 0, and HARA utilities with identical
risk tolerance, R and B can be aggregated in a composite saver, and hence the Modigliani-Miller result would hold. A
detailed proof is available upon request.
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run does not occur at t=2, the bank needs to repay the impatient depositors and decide how much
liquidity to transfer to period 3, LIQ2.11 So the bank’s choice in period 2, assuming that a bank-run
does not occur, is 12
δ ·DR(1+ rD2 )+LIQ2 ≤ LIQ1 (ψB2 ) (24)
When there is not a run, B does not withdraw any of her deposits. So in this case all that she decides
in the second period is whether to rebalance her portfolio of bank equity and the liquid asset to
transfer wealth in the third period, i.e.,
PsecxBsec+LIQ
B
2 ≤ LIQB1 +PsecxBeq (25)
The consumption of B in state 3s when the bank survives period 2 is equal her share of banking
profits plus her endowments, repayment on her deposits and her liquid holdings, i.e.,
cB,no-run3s ≤
EB+ xBsec
EB+ xReq+ xBeq
max
[
V I3sI(1+ r
I)+LIQ2−
(
(1−δ)DR+DB)(1+ rD3 ),0]
+VD3sD
B(1+ rD3 )+LIQ
B
2 + e
B
3s (λ
B,no-run
3s ) (26)
The maximum operator captures the fact that bank shareholders are protected by limited liability
and that their other sources of income cannot be seized to repay depositors in bankruptcy. When
the value of total assets is lower that the outstanding deposits, the bank is liquidated and the salvage
value of the bank is distributed pro-rata to depositors. As a result, the percentage repayment on
deposits, which are not withdrawn ealry, is
VD3s = min
[
1,
V I3sI(1+ r
I)+LIQ2
((1−δ)DR+DB)(1+ rD3 )
]
(27)
A different set of conditions apply when a bank-run occurs. Recall this can only happen if
depositors have rationally determined that the value of the bank’s assets are less than promised
deposit repayments. In a run the bank liquidates its portfolio and distributes the resulting funds,
LIQ1+ξ · I, to depositors on a first-come, first-served basis. Hence, each depositor will be repaid in
full with probability
LIQ1+ξ · I
(DR+DB)
(
1+ rD2
) .
In this scenario B carries over her liquid holding, LIQB1 and any deposit repayment she receives,
into the third period and consumes them together with the new endowment, eB3s. If B is lucky, she
will receive her deposits in full and her consumption in the third period will be
cB,run,paid3s ≤ DB(1+ rD2 )+LIQB1 + eB3s (λB,run,paid3s ). (28)
11The bank could also opt to participate in the secondary market for equity and buyback shares. This could be the case
if shares are priced at an attractive enough discount. In particular, an equity buyback requires that Psec < PBeq. But this
can never occur in an equilibrium, because R would never invest in equity in the first place (see previous section). Thus,
we abstract from this generalization given that it would never occur in equilibrium.
12Loans are liquidated at a sufficiently large penalty so it never makes sense to plan to use this source of funding to
pay depositors unless there is a run.
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Otherwise, she will just consume out of her new endowment and her liquid holdings, i.e.,
cB,run,unpaid3s ≤ LIQB1 + eB3s (λB,run,unpaid3s ). (29)
Optimal consumption choices imply that λB1 =U
B ′(cB1 ), λ
B,run,paid
3s = q ·θ ·ω3s UB
′
(cB,run,paid3s ),
λB,run,unpaid3s = q(1−θ)ω3sUR
′
(cB,run,unpaid3s ) and λ
B,no-run
3s = (1−q) ·ω3sUB
′
(cB,no-run3s ).
ψB1 and ψ
B
2 are the Lagrange multipliers for the balance sheet constraints of the bank in the first and
second periods (constraints (23) and (24) respectively). From the optimality condition for LIQB1 , we
obtain that ψB1 = ψ
B
2 .
Denote by sD = {s :VD3s < 1} the set of states where the bank defaults. B manages the bank on
behalf of the equityholders, so when she optimizes she will ignore states in which the bank defaults
and equity is wiped out. The optimality condition for equity raising by R, is
ψB1P
B
eq−
EB+ xBeq
EB+ xReq+ xBeq
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s DPS3s = 0 (30)
where DPS3s =
pi3s
EB+ xReq+ xBeq
are the dividends per share and pi3s =V I3sI(1+ r
I)+LIQ2−VD3s((1−
δ)DR+DB)(1+ rD3 ) are the total banking profits.
The optimal choices of risky loans’ extension and deposit taking, respectively, yield:
−ψB1 +
EB+ xBsec
EB+ xReq+ xBeq
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s V
I
3s(1+ r
I) = 0, (31)
ψB1
(
1−δ(1+ rD2 )
)− (1−δ) EB+ xBsec
EB+ xReq+ xBeq
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s (1+ r
D
3 ) = 0. (32)
Combining conditions (31) and (32), provides several important insights about the way this
model works. In particular, these two jointly imply that
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s
[
V I3s(1+ r
I)− 1−δ
1−δ(1+ rD2 )
(1+ rD3 )
]
= 0, (33)
which says that the expected intermediation spread under limited liability, weighted by the banker’s
marginal utility, is zero. To better understand this condition, suppose that rD2 = 0. Then, in the two
states that the bank cares about, the spread between loans and deposits in state 3g is rI − rD > 0,
while in state 3m it is V I3m(1+ r
I)− (1+ rD)< 0. So (33) implies that bank takes on sufficient risk
and leverage so that it makes losses in the medium risk state of the world. This risk-shifting takes
place because the bank ignores the consequences of its investment decision in the bankruptcy state
(V I3b(1+ r
I)− (1+ rD)), which it would have accounted for under unlimited liability (see section
3.2).
While B ignores the bankruptcy state R does not. R recognizes that the excessive risk-taking
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lowers the percentage repayment on deposits in bankrupcty, VD3b. So R will would charge a higher
deposit rate (equation (16)) to account for this risk. One critical feature of the model is that the bank
does not recognize that R is behaving this way so the limited liability creates a pecuniary externality
in the competitive equilibrium.13
In addition, the desire of the bank to take more leverage increases the probability of a bank-
run.14 But notice that q is absent in (33), which means that when the bank risk-shifts it also ignores
the impact on the probability of a run. Savers do care about run risk when they decide how much
equity and deposits to invest in the bank (equations (16) and (17)), and increases in q reduce their
investment in the bank. This is a second externality present in the competitive equilibrium. Section
3.3 discusses how a constrained planner takes this pair of externalities into consideration to make
Pareto improving investment and leverage choices.
In selling equity the bank equates the benefits of having more funding in the first period versus
the marginal utility of the future dividends that are forgone in period three, weighted by the marginal
utility of income in those states of the world where dividends are paid. Substituting equations (31)
and (32) into (30), it is easy to see that the price that B is willing to issue equity, PBeq, will not
be lower than 1, which is the price of existing equity in the bank. PBeq > 1 requires that r
D
2 > 0,
otherwise PBeq = 1. If the price that R is willing to buy equity, P
R
eq, is lower than P
B
eq, then x
R
eq = 0 due
to the fact that B is not allowed to sell his initial equity holdings, EB, or short-sell equity. Otherwise
PReq = P
B
eq and x
R
eq > 0.
Using just these optimality conditions, it is possible to make several observations about the
structure of the bank’s assets and liabilities that will be useful in our subsequent analysis. The
proofs for these claims are given in the appendix, so in the body of the text we merely give the
intuition for the findings and explain their significance.
Proposition 1: In period 1, the voluntarily investment of the bank in the liquid asset does not
exceed the expected deposit withdrawals in period 2 , i.e., LIQ2 = 0.
This results follows from the limited liability for the bank which drives many of the subsequent
results. When B is managing the assets of the bank, she will only consider states that the bank is
13In other words, the banker is acting like a price-taker who only sees the interest rate that she is forced to offer to
attract deposits. The banker is not considering the full supply schedule that the savers contemplate, i.e., she is ignoring
the full consumption-savings problem that the savers face. This externality is not present when the prefect competition
assumption is dropped. Geanakoplos (1997) proposes a more elaborate market structure such that borrowers account for
the “collateral value" of their portfolio on the decision of lenders, while preserving the competitive pricing assumption.
He postulates that each lending contract should not only specify the interest rate, but also the resources available to
lenders when borrowers default. Then, the supply schedule of each depositor would include a menu of three-dimensional
contracts specifying all possible combinations of interest rates, liability structures and asset allocations for the bank,
and the bank would then choose the contract that maximizes its objective. This enhanced contract structure can result
in constraint efficient allocations in the absence of other externalities (see Geanakoplos and Zame (2013)). It seems
plausible to think of such comprehensive contracts in mortgage and bilateral repo markets, but it is hard to conceive of
deposit or intermediated lending contracts that are contingent on the whole balance sheet of borrowing institutions (even
if such financial innovation may be desirable).
14It is easy to see that the bank will not voluntarily issue long-term (LT) debt. Consider that rD2 = 0. Then, the bank
would offer rLT = rD3 on long-term debt (equation (32)), while savers would require r
LT > rD3 (equation (16)), because
short-term debt carries a liquidity discount. The same holds for rD2 > 0, but the calculations are more complicated.
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solvent. Given that in those states, depositors have to be repaid in full at a positive interest rate, the
banker will never allocate a marginal unit of funds to an asset that pays a zero return, even though
these funds might increase the amount available to the bank’s creditors in bankruptcy. This is a
general result which holds even when the yield on the riskless asset is positive or allowed to vary
endogenously as long it is lower that the deposit rate. Provided this return differential holds then
the logic of the of proposition 1 will obtain.
B will choose the minimum interest rate offered to depositors who withdraw early, rD2 . The bank
opts for the lowest deposit rate, rD2 because the amount of liquidity that the bank needs to hold from
period 1 to period 2 is increasing in rD2 other things equal. Given that the liquid asset is dominated
by the risky loan in net present value terms, the bank will choose to hold the minimum liquidity
necessary since it disregards any other general equilibrium effects that higher liquid asset holding
bring along.
Moreover, the equilibrium long-term deposit rate, rD3 , should be high enough such that patient
depositors have an incentive to keep their deposits in the bank as long as long as they expect that
other patient depositors will act the same way. The incentive compatibility constraint such that
patient households do not withdraw early in normal times has to account for the possibility of
trading in the secondary equity market after withdrawing (see Fahri et al. (2009) for a Diamond-
Dybvig model with hidden trades). The consumption of a patient depositors who waits given that
all other depositors also wait is given by equation (13). On the other hand, if he withdraws early
he can consume xR
′
sec (DPS3s−Psec)+DR(1+ rD2 )+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2 , where xR
′
sec is the number
of equity shares he purchases in the secondary equity market, and is different from the number of
shares, xRsec, that depositors who do not withdraw early purchase. The optimal x
R′
sec is given by
Psec =
∑sω3sUR
(
xR
′
sec (DPS3s−Psec)+DR(1+ rD2 )+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2
)
DPS3s
∑sω3sUR
(
xR′sec (DPS3s−Psec)+DR(1+ rD2 )+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2
) , (34)
where Psec is given by combining equations (19) and (20). Then, patient depositors will prefer to
wait if
∑
s
ω3sUR
(
xRsec (DPS3s−Psec)+VD3sDR(1+ rD3 )+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2
)≥
∑
s
ω3sUR
(
xR
′
sec (DPS3s−Psec)+DR(1+ rD2 )+LIQR1 +PsecxReq+ eR2
)
(35)
(35) simply says that the total expected utility that a patient household obtains by waiting is higher
that the utility from withdrawing early given than only impatient household withdraw and all other
patient ones wait, and it should hold for both xR
′
sec = 0 and x
R′
sec > 0 (given by (34)) since a patient
depositor who withdraws early can opt to trade in the secondary market or not. In the calibrations
we consider, (35) will be satisfied for rD2 = 0.
It is also possible to be more specific about the way that the bank will be funded. First, we
outline conditions under which B will not invest any of her period 1 endowment in bank deposits
16
or the liquid asset. B does not hold deposits in the bank (i.e., DB = 0) or invest in the liquid asset
(LIQB1 = 0), if the following conditions hold, respectively, in equilibrium:
−UB′(eB1 )+(1−q)∑
s
ω3sUB
′
(cB,no-run3s )V
D
3s(1+ r
D
3 )+q ·θ ·∑
s
ω3sUB
′
(eB3s)(1+ r
D
2 )< 0 (36)
−UB′(eB1 )+(1−q)∑
s
ω3sUB
′
(cB,no-run3s )+q∑
s
ω3sUB
′
(eB3s)< 0 (37)
The decision to invest in the liquid asset is akin to the decision that R makes. Incrementally
investing in the safe asset reduces first period consumption and then transfers resources to the second
period which will support future consumption (which will differ depending on whether or not a run
occurs). A more precise statement can be made about whether B will invest more of her endowment
in bank equity.
Proposition 2: If the bank defaults in any state of the world, then B will not devote any of her
endowment to investing in equity in the bank, i.e., xBeq = 0.
This reluctance of B to provide more equity comes because the bank only has a debt contract
with the entrepreneur. So when the entrepreneur’s project fails, B is already at risk for suffering
losses before any depositors are paid, but when the project succeeds the upside gains to B are capped
by the interest payment. So if B were to invest in more equity, doing so would add more losses in
states of nature when B already has low consumption in exchange for additional consumption in
other states where consumption would already be higher.
In contrast, for R there potentially are gains to providing some funding through both debt and
equity. The advantage of debt funding is that it is partly protected in cases where P defaults on the
loan. The motivation to provide some equity funding is that the bank is already charging P more for
the loan than it is paying on its deposits. By buying some equity in the bank, R partially shares in
the profits from intermediation. By this same logic, B might be interested in depositing some of her
endowment in the bank in order to partially hedge against the default risk of P. Hence, because we
will always consider environments where default can occur the feasible equilibria to be studied can
possibly involve an equity investment in the bank by R and deposits by either R and/or B.
Finally, the condition that clears the secondary market for equity is
xReq = (1−δ)xRsec (38)
The total supply of banking shares is xReq since both impatient and patient savers offer their shares
for sale. However, only a fraction of 1−δ savers purchase stocks in addition to any shares that the
bank buys back and cancels.
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3 Benchmarks
Before we examine how regulation can affect economic outcomes, we first solve for calibrated
version of the competitive economy and contrast it to two alternatives. The first is one where
borrowers are not protected by limited liability. With unlimited liability the total amount that can
borrowed is capped by agents endowments in the bad states of the world where the project fails.
These natural debt limits result in lower credit extension and provide a useful benchmark that can
be contrasted to competitive equilibrium. The second comparison is to the equilibrium selected by
a constrained social planner who internalizes everything and can choose allocations directly. In this
second benchmark, the planner respects the pricing of contracts in the competitive equilibrium and
can only use the existing assets to reallocate resources across agents.
3.1 Calibrated competitive equilibrium
The full set of parameters we used to solve the model and the equilibrium outcomes are shown in
the appendix in Tables 18 and 19, respectively. Let us just call attention to five of the considerations
that we took into account in choosing these parameters.
First, the probablities of default and losses given default will determine the amount of default
risk that B is being facing. The baseline calibration supposes that P defaults in both the medium and
bad state, but that there is enough bank equity so that depositors only suffer losses in the bad state.
Some of the other parameters in this simulation, such as the coefficient of relative risk aversion
(set to 2.1 for each agent)for a CRRA utility and the share of income for the risky technology
accruing to the entrepreneur (set to 0.3) are chosen to match standard estimates from the literature.15
Though others such as the level of the endowments, the probabilities of default, and losses given
default, are hard to judge in isolation. Collectively these parameters do influence the level of capital
in the bank, so these were chosen so that in this example the (endogenous) capital ratio would be
around 15%.
Overall, this parameterization should be taken more as an illustrative example than a realistic
calibration of the economy. We have experimented with various other parameter choices and the
findings are very robust. The robustness is not surprising because the model is still simple enough
so that the main driving forces behind the most important results are easy to understand.
Second, the spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate is large enough that R finds
it appealing to invest a small amount of his endowment in equity in the bank. But most of R′s
savings are in the form of deposits. In this example, B opts not to make any deposits in the bank,
though we have explored other parameterizations in which B does make deposits and nothing that
we emphasize in what follows depends on whether B does or does not make a deposit.
15Gollin (2005) finds that the share of profits in entrepreneurial activities is 0.10. The rest is the share of labor and
capital. In our setting, labor from workers is not modeled, and we are interested in the share of the remaining output
which is distributed to entrepreneurs and supplier of capital. Setting the share of capital relatively to labor to 0.30,which
is standard in the literature, give a relative share for entrepreneurial and capital profits of 0.1/(0.1+0.9 ·0.3) = 0.28 and
(0.9 ·0.3)/(0.1+0.9 ·0.3) = 0.72, respectively.
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Third, the liquidation value, ξ, of long-term investment is such that the probability that a depos-
itor will be fully repaid if a bank run occurs is θ = 0.67. This sets the probability of a bank run at
around 11%. Except in a run, the patient households never choose to withdraw early.
Fourth, the lending rate is attractive enough for P to borrow substantially. One way to assess
the level of borrowing is to compare it to the total endowment that is available in period 1. Judged
that way, investment accounts for about 21% of total first period resources. The other way, which
perhaps is more informative about the preference of P to gamble by exploiting limited liability is to
note that investment exceeds P′s third period endowment by a factor of nearly three.
Fifth, expected volatility of consumption for the entrepreneur is substantial. Of course, this
depends mostly on the endowments but the endogenous investment choices also matter and because
of the high level of investment, P′s consumption is about 2.9 times more in the good state than in
medium and 7.26 times than in the bad state, even though endowments are the same in the good and
medium state, and only 2.4 times higher than in the bad state. R′s consumption is also substantially
more volatile in the second period than are his endowments.
Table 1: Main variables
V I2g = 1.00 V
D
2g = 1.00 CR= 14.77%
I
∑e1
= 21%
cP,no-run3g
cP,no-run3m
= 2.91
cR,p,no-run3g
cR,p,no-run3m
= 1.06
V I2m = 0.82 V
D
2m = 1 LR= 21.31%
I
eP3g
= 2.55
cP,no-run3g
cP,no-run3b
= 7.26
cR,p,no-run3g
cR,p,no-run3b
= 1.80
V I2b = 0.17 V
D
2b = 0.23 q= 10.93%
I
eP3b
= 6.37 rI − rD = 17.46%
E
(
cR,p,no-run3s
)
cR,i,no-run2
= 1.19
3.2 Unlimited liability
To better understand the competitive calibration consider how things change when agents are subject
to unlimited liability. We present this alternative to clarify the importance of the limited liability
which we have seen leads to excessive risk-taking. Table 19 presents the full set of outcomes.
When default is not permitted then all lending contracts will be constrained by the endowments
of the entrepreneur and the bank, so that there is always enough collateral that can be seized to
insure that deposits and loans are fully repaid.16 This restriction, therefore, naturally reduces lending
which in turn significantly reduces P′s welfare since the profitability of the project in the good state
is forgone. The size of this effect depends on P′s endowments in the bad state because in this state
output from the risky investment is not high enough to cover the loan obligation. So the size of that
endowment determines the natural borrowing limit that P will face.
16This requires that all of the future endowments/income of agents can be collateralized.
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Curtailing the ability of P to take loans, reduces the size of the bank’s balance sheet and conse-
quently its leverage. In this calibration, the liquidation value of the bank’s assets over total deposits
is higher than one
(
LIQ1+ξ · I
DR(1+ rD2 )
= 1.34
)
, and the probability of a bank-run is zero.17
The option to default is valuable for B, because she can take advantage of higher profits when
the project succeeds while protecting her wealth in the bad state from being seized. Under unlimited
liability the spread between borrowing and lending drops to zero, because both deposits and loans
will be risk-free. In principle, R could be better or worse off. On one hand, eliminating default helps
him. On the other hand, the return on savings is lower and R can hedge less effectively, since he
can invest only in a risk-free asset instead of acquiring both deposits and equity. We find that risky
investment drops by 87.93% and all agents are worse-off compared to the economy with limited
liability. P′s utility drops by 1.15%, R′s by 3.84% and B′s by 1.02%.18
3.3 Constrained social planner
As a second point of comparison we solve for the allocations that a social planner will choose. We
require the planner’s allocations to be incentive compatible for each agent.19 This means that the
planner recognizes the distorting effects of limited liability and internalizes the social inefficiency
of a run, but combats these problems using existing traded contracts. Also, the pricing of these
contracts remains consistent with the payoffs that they deliver to the agents as in the competitive
equilibrium. Finally, the planner respects the incentive compatibility constraint (35), which means
that the planner cannot choose very low deposit rates because depositors’ types are private informa-
tion and patient depositors may prefer to withdraw early.20
Given market incompleteness, we cannot unambiguously construct a social welfare function.
Thus, we assign weights for different agents in a social welfare function (and study different con-
stellations of these weights). In the comparisons with different weights, we want to make sure that
the baseline level of utilities of the agents are similar; for instance, if B′s base level of utility is
much different than the other agents, then transfers between B and the other agents will mechan-
17Bank-runs are, in principle, possible even with unlimited liability as in Diamond-Dybvig. The initial banking capital
EB in our model protects depositors against early liquidation when the bank has a small balance sheet.
18Market incompleteness and limited risk-sharing renders the default option valuable for agents, because it expands the
set of assets they can trade. See Dubey et al. (2005) and Zame (1993) for a proof that default can be welfare improving
when assets markets are incomplete.
19The planner also respects the short-sales constraints for equity holdings (IP,xReq,x
B
eq ≥ 0), deposits (DR,DB ≥ 0), and
liquid holdings by all agents, as well as the nature of the demand deposit contract which stipulates that rD2 ,r
D
3 ≥ 0.
20We assume that the planner cannot restrict depositors who withdraw early from trading in the secondary market for
equity. Thus, the planner needs to account for the fact that agents may engage in hidden trades. Given the allocations
that the planner chooses, the effective equity price in the secondary market is given by the resources transferred to the
impatient depositors who “sell" their total equity holdings to the patient ones, i.e., Psec =
1−δ
δ
eR2 −LIQsp2
xReq
. Finally, the
planner can influence the decision of agents to purchase equity in the secondary market, i.e. the planner can introduce a
wedge in the optimality conditions (19), (20) and (34). These jointly determine the level of “out-of-equilibrium" hidden
trades, which is an input in the incentive compatibility constraint (35) faced by the planner. In section, 4.2 we present
specific tools that can be used to implement the planner’s solution when the incentive compatibility constraint in the
presence of hidden trades is binding.
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ically generate changes in the aggregate, weighted average level of utility. To eliminate this issue
we normalize agents’ utilities by the (indirect) utility they obtain in the competitive equilibrium
denoted by V¯ c.e.. We take the absolute value because the equilibrium value of utilities is negative.21
The social welfare function we consider, with weights wP, wR and wB, which are positive and sum
up to 1, is:
U¯ sp = wP
U¯P
|V¯P,c.e.| +w
R U¯
R
|V¯R,c.e.| +w
B U¯
B
|V¯B,c.e.| (39)
where U¯P, U¯R and U¯B are given by equations (2), (9) and (21), respectively.
We proceed by constructing the budget constraints for the social planner. In the calibration of
the competitive equilibrium B does not invest in bank equity, deposits or the liquid asset, and P does
not invest any of his initial endowment in the risky project, and the bank sets rD2 =0. For simplicity,
the planner’s budget constraints that follow presume that these properties will be true, but we verify
that this is the case in equilibrium.22 Thus, the planner faces the following period 1 budget/resource
constraint, which is derived by combining constraints (3), (10), (22), and (23):
cP1 + c
R
1 + c
B
1 + I
sp+LIQsp1 ≤ eP1 + eR1 + eB1 +EB, (40)
where c1P ≤ eP1 and c1B ≤ eB1 . Constraint (40) says that the planner allocates all available resources
in period 1 to current consumption and investment by the bank in the liquid and risky technologies.
The way that the future payoffs from these investments are allocated to agents is constrained by the
underlying assets the planner is obliged to use. The implicit deposit and equity holdings to R are
given by DR =
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
δ
and xReq = I
sp− 1−δ−φ
δ
LIQsp1 −EB, respectively.23
Since B has no deposits, the resource constraint of the planner in period 2 in the event of a run
comes from combining equations (14) and (15):
cR,run,paid2 ·δ
LIQsp1 +ξ · Isp
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
+ cR,run,unpaid2 ·
(
1−δLIQ
sp
1 +ξ · Isp
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
)
≤ LIQsp1 +ξ · Isp+ eR2 . (41)
where cR,run,unpaid2 ≤ eR2 . Constraint (41) says if there is a bank-run, the planner liquidates the bank’s
loans, and uses the proceeds along with the liquid assets and the available endowment in period 2
to pay off depositors in a first-come, first-first served fashion. Some depositors will be repaid their
deposits in full, while the rest receive nothing and must consume their new endowment.
If a bank run is avoided, equations (11), (12), combined with the equity market clearing condi-
21We could have adjusted the intercepts in the agents’ original utility functions to essentially do the same thing. All that
matters is setting the baseline levels of utility so that marginal transfers do not automatically create first-order changes
purely because of a failure to normalize properly.
22These non-negativity and short-selling constraints are binding in the competitive equilibrium. So the individual
agents would have preferred to violate these constraints. Hence, we forbid the planner from achieving gains by violating
the constraints.
23The implicit level of deposits is derived using constraint (24) and denoting by φ ·LIQsp1 the liquid holdings (LIQ2)
that the bank transfers from period 2 to period 3, where φ ∈ [0,1]. The implicit level of equity is derived from constraint
(23) using the fact that the pricing of equity in the competitive equilibrium yields PBeq = 1.
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tion, (38), give the period 2 resource constraint of the planner:
δ · cR,i,no-run2 +φ ·LIQsp1 +(1−δ)LIQsp2 ≤ LIQsp1 + eR2 (42)
Constraint (42) says that the planner has liquid assets from the first period plus the second period
endowment available to distribute. These resources must be divided between repaying deposits,
funding consumption by the impatient households and reinvesting in the liquid asset to support
subsequent consumption. Total investment in safe assets consists of the amount of liquid assets held
by the bank from period 2 to period 3, φ ·LIQsp1 , and the liquid holding of all patient households,
LIQsp2 .
The resource constraints in state s in period 3 when a bank run does not occur are:
(1−δ) · cR,p,no-run3s + cB,no-run3s + cP,no-run3s ≤ A3s · (Isp)a+φLIQsp1 +(1−δ)LIQsp2 + eB3s+ eP3s. (43)
The constraints say that the total payoff from the risky investment, the liquid holdings in the bank
and the liquid assets held by patient households plus the new endowments are distributed to patient
households, entrepreneurs and bankers for consumption.
Using the fact that investment was optimally chosen so that 1+ rI = a ·A2g · Ia and that DR =
LIQ1(1−φ)
δ
, and setting η=
xReq
EB+ xReq
, R′s consumption is states 3g, 3m and 3b is given by:
cR,p,no-run3g ≤
1
1−δ ·η ·
(
a ·A3g · (Isp)a+φLIQsp1
)
+
1
δ
(1−η) · (1−φ)LIQsp1 (1+ rD3 )+LIQsp2 (44)
cR,p,no-run3m ≤
1
1−δ ·η ·
(
A3m · (Isp)a+φLIQsp1
)
+
1
δ
(1−η) · (1−φ)LIQsp1 (1+ rD3 )+LIQsp2 (45)
cR,p,no-run3b ≤
1
1−δ ·
(
A3b · (Isp)a+φLIQsp1
)
+LIQsp2 . (46)
Constraints (44), (45) and (46) say that the aggregate consumption of patient households given that
the bank survives ((1−δ)cR,p,no-run3s ) is equal to their share of banking profits (η ) plus the repayment
on outstanding deposits and the liquidity carried over from period 2. Banking profits are equal to the
return on risky investment and the liquid banking holdings carried over from period 2 minus deposit
repayment. In state 3g the entrepreneur fully repays his loan and the bank receives a fraction a
of the total output, while in state 3m he defaults and the bank receives the all the output (which
was pledged as collateral). In both cases, deposits are repaid in full. In state 3b both the bank and
the entrepreneur default and depositors receive the salvage value of the risky investment and the
remaining liquidity held by the bank.24
24The planner respects the incentives of private agents in choosing whether to default. Thus, the planner will default
on the loan when total output is less that the promised repayment and will default on deposits when the salvage value of
the bank is less than the outstanding deposits.
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The planner recognizes the balance sheet constraint that implies:
η=
Isp− 1−δ−φδ LIQsp1 −EB
Isp− 1−δ−φδ LIQsp1
(47)
and, in addition, respects the pricing of rD3 in the competitive solution, given by:
1+rD3 =
UR
′
(cR1 )−q ·δ LIQ
sp
1 +ξ·Isp
LIQsp1 (1−φ)U
R′(cR,run,paid2 )− (1−q)
[
δ ·UR′(cR,i,no-run2 )+(1−δ)ω3bUR
′
(cR,p,no-run3b ) · δ1−δ
A3b·(Isp)a
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
]
(1−q) · (1−δ)
[
UR′(cR,p,no-run3g )+U
R′(cR,p,no-run3m )
] ,
(48)
which is derived from equation (16) after substituting the probability that depositors are served in a
bank-run and equations (7), (27).
Importantly, the planner internalizes the effect of the investment decisions on the probability of
a bank run, and thus accounts for the fact that
q=
(
1−δLIQ
sp
1 +ξ · Isp
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
)2
(49)
or q= 0 if δ
LIQsp1 +ξ · Isp
LIQsp1 (1−φ)
≥ 1.
P′s consumption in state 3g given that a bank run does not occur is
cP,no-run3g ≤ (1−a) ·A3g · (Isp)a+ eP3g (50)
Finally, the following constraints are (trivially) satisfied
cP,no-run3m ≤ eP3m, cP,no-run3b ≤ eP3b, cP,run3s ≤ eP3s, cB,run3s ≤ eB3s (51)
The planner chooses
(
cP1 ,c
P,no-run
3s ,c
P,run
3s
)
,
(
cR1 ,c
R,i,no-run
2 ,c
R,run,paid
2 ,c
R,run,unpaid
2 ,c
R,p,no-run
3s
)
,(
cB1 ,c
B,no-run
3s ,c
B,run
3s
)
, Isp,LIQsp1 ,LIQ
sp
2 ,η,r
D
3 ,q to maximize (39) subject to constraints (40)-(51).
The planner wrestles with two considerations. On the one hand, it is desirable to reduce the risk
of the run. On the other hand, the planner tries to mitigate the problems arising from excessive risk-
taking. Table (2) shows regardless of the weights on the different agents, the planner can always
achieve higher overall social welfare than the competitive economy. It is helpful to distinguish three
responses from the planner to alleviate the two externalities. First, the planner can choose higher
liquidity ratios and (much) lower investment than the competitive equilibrium. These cases are
indicated by purple shading in the table. Second, the planner can choose higher capital ratios and
lower investment (as indicated by the blue shaded region). Third, the planner can choose higher
capital ratios and higher investment than the competitive solution (the green region). The planner’s
best response depends on the weights assigned to the three types of agents in the social welfare
function. In other words, the planner will correct for the bank-run and risk-taking externalities
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differently depending on which of the agents are favored.
In our analysis we will consider all possible potential Pareto weights. Taken literally, one might
decide that the bankers per se should be given little weight in the objective function, since they
constitute such a small percentage of the population (and wealth distribution). But, given their
political clout in regulatory questions, we think it is instructive to see which kind of outcomes
would emerge if the planner behaves as if the bankers have a disproportionately high weight.
Table 2: % Change in Social Welfare: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 6.77% 5.43% 4.10% 2.77% 2.05% 2.08% 2.13% 2.21%
0.200 5.79% 4.44% 3.10% 2.02% 2.05% 2.10% 2.19% -
0.300 4.82% 3.47% 2.12% 2.02% 2.07% 2.18% - -
wP 0.400 3.86% 2.51% 1.99% 2.05% 2.17% - - -
0.500 2.92% 1.95% 2.03% 2.17% - - - -
0.600 1.92% 2.01% 2.18% - - - - -
0.700 2.01% 2.22% - - - - - -
0.800 2.31% - - - - - - -
To understand the intuition for these findings, notice two things about the structure of the model.
First, a run is welfare-reducing for all three agents: some savers lose their deposits, the entrepreneurs
have their loans pulled, and the bank (and the saver) see their equity wiped out. So the planner can
make everyone better off by driving down the probability of a run. Table (3) shows the change in
the probability of a bank-run between the competitive equilibrium and the planner’s solution. No
matter who the planner cares most about most, it is always desirable to reduce the likelihood of a
run.
Table 3: Percentage points difference in the probability of a bank-run: Constrained Planner vs.
Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 -7.30% -7.47% -7.65% -7.81% -10.86% -10.93% -10.93% -10.93%
0.200 -6.81% -6.97% -7.14% -10.84% -10.92% -10.93% -10.93% -
0.300 -6.30% -6.46% -6.61% -10.92% -10.93% -10.93% - -
wP 0.400 -5.78% -5.93% -10.91% -10.93% -10.93% - - -
0.500 -5.25% -10.91% -10.93% -10.93% - - - -
0.600 -10.90% -10.93% -10.93% - - - - -
0.700 -10.93% -10.93% - - - - - -
0.800 -10.93% - - - - - - -
Second, there two ways of reducing the risk of the run. The bank can be made to hold more safe
assets and do less lending, or it can be forced to increase equity financing and rely less on deposit
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financing. Either of these actions make deposits safer, but the endogenous response by the agents
will differ markedly and the allocational impact will also be quite different. Tables 4 and 5 show
the change in capital and liquidity ratios compared to the competitive equilibrium,
Table 4: Percentage points difference in Capital Ratios: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equi-
librium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 -1.77% -1.53% -1.27% -1.04% 33.43% 34.66% 35.23% 35.23%
0.200 -2.35% -2.17% -1.96% 33.24% 34.55% 35.23% 35.23% -
0.300 -2.87% -2.72% -2.57% 34.43% 35.23% 35.23% - -
wP 0.400 -3.34% -3.21% 34.30% 35.23% 35.23% - - -
0.500 -3.75% 34.16% 35.23% 35.23% - - - -
0.600 34.00% 35.23% 35.23% - - - - -
0.700 35.23% 35.23% - - - - - -
0.800 35.23% - - - - - - -
Table 5: Percentage points difference in Liquidity Ratios: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive
Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 85.66% 89.42% 93.70% 97.64% -8.36% -8.66% -8.81% -8.81%
0.200 76.10% 79.12% 82.47% -8.31% -8.64% -8.81% -8.81% -
0.300 67.60% 70.07% 72.65% -8.61% -8.81% -8.81% - -
wP 0.400 60.00% 62.06% -8.58% -8.81% -8.81% - - -
0.500 53.18% -8.54% -8.81% -8.81% - - - -
0.600 -8.50% -8.81% -8.81% - - - - -
0.700 -8.81% -8.81% - - - - - -
0.800 -8.81% - - - - - - -
Consider first the scenarios in which the planner compels the bank to reduce deposit finance
and increase equity financing. This directly reduces the option value that bank gets from potentially
defaulting on its deposits. So if the planner cares a lot about the banker, as in the upper left portion
of the Tables, this not the best way to deal with the run. So this consideration explains why in
Tables 4 and 5 and the planner lowers capital ratios and raises liquid asset holdings when the banker
is relatively important.
When the banker is relatively less important, the planner pushes the bank to use more equity
financing. This approach reduces bank’s ability to exploit limited liability. However, from Table
3, we see that the planner will almost eliminate the run and by eliminating that risk the bank is
typically still better off than in the competitive equilibrium. The other two agents clearly prefer this
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way of controlling the run. For R this approach gives him a higher return on savings. P is not nearly
as constrained as when liquidity regulation is aggressively deployed.
The planner is also aware of the perverse incentives created by limited liability and resulting
distortions in interest rates. Table 6 shows the change in investment as determined by the planner
compared to the competitive equilibrium. The gambling by the bank and entrepreneur in most cases
leads to more investment than the social planner prefers.
Table 6: % Change in Investment: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 -39.66% -40.71% -41.87% -42.86% -2.84% -2.59% -1.18% 2.28%
0.200 -36.80% -37.73% -38.73% -2.91% -2.62% -0.50% 3.32% -
0.300 -34.04% -34.86% -35.69% -2.64% 0.36% 4.63% - -
wP 0.400 -31.36% -32.10% -2.68% 1.50% 6.32% - - -
0.500 -28.77% -2.71% 3.07% 8.44% - - - -
0.600 -2.74% 5.33% 11.74% - - - - -
0.700 9.15% 16.38% - - - - - -
0.800 23.89% - - - - - - -
The exceptions to this general pattern happen for two reasons. If the planner is sufficiently
concerned with P′s welfare, as in the lower left portion of the table, then the planner wants to allow
P to invest more. Table 7 shows change the intermediation spread, rI− rD, and notice that when the
weight on P is sufficiently high, the planner will make the spread negative. This is a way to transfer
resources to R and P at the expense of B. We consider these cases sufficiently implausible that we
exclude them from consideration in our subsequent discussion of optimal regulation.
Table 7: Percentage points difference in Intermediation Spread: Constrained Planner vs. Competi-
tive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 81.11% 82.33% 83.68% 82.30% 50.31% 50.41% 46.00% 33.47%
0.200 77.94% 78.95% 80.07% 50.29% 50.40% 43.59% 29.58% -
0.300 75.00% 75.86% 75.85% 50.39% 40.48% 24.59% - -
wP 0.400 72.27% 73.02% 50.38% 36.34% 17.99% - - -
0.500 69.73% 50.37% 30.55% 9.85% - - - -
0.600 50.36% 21.96% -4.38% - - - - -
0.700 7.97% -25.01% - - - - - -
0.800 -58.95% - - - - - - -
The other cases where the planner compels extra investment occur for a more subtle reason.
Consider the upper right portion of the Table 6. In this region, planner puts relatively little weight
on both the entrepreneur and the bank. In the green shaded areas investment also rises. In these
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cases, capital has been increased sufficiently to drive the risk of a run to zero. At this point, there
are two ways left to keep helping R. One is raise deposit rates. Table 8 shows that is one thing that
happens. The other is to raise investment to improve dividend payouts that R also partially receives.
Table 8: Deposit Rate in Planner’s solution
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.22
0.200 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.26 -
0.300 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.30 - -
wP 0.400 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.36 - - -
0.500 0.06 0.08 0.25 0.43 - - - -
0.600 0.08 0.32 0.56 - - - - -
0.700 0.45 0.74 - - - - - -
0.800 1.05 - - - - - - -
Although the planner improves social welfare for all combination of weights, the benefits to
each agent differ across the various cases. Tables 9, 10 and 11 show the changes in utility for P, R,
and B respectively. Whenever the planner controls the run by increasing capital P and R are always
better off. For the most part, B also gains, except for the perverse cases we mentioned earlier where
the intermediation spread is pushed negative.
Table 9: % Change in P’s Welfare: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 -0.81% -0.86% -0.92% -0.97% 1.89% 1.91% 1.97% 2.12%
0.200 -0.68% -0.72% -0.76% 1.88% 1.91% 2.00% 2.16% -
0.300 -0.58% -0.61% -0.64% 1.91% 2.04% 2.21% - -
wP 0.400 -0.49% -0.51% 1.91% 2.09% 2.28% - - -
0.500 -0.42% 1.90% 2.15% 2.35% - - - -
0.600 1.90% 2.24% 2.48% - - - - -
0.700 2.39% 2.64% - - - - - -
0.800 2.89% - - - - - - -
The combinations of the weights which are shaded purple feature large increases in liquid asset
holdings by the bank, big increases in the lending rate (and the intermediation spread), and a collapse
of investment. These combinations are designed to improve the welfare of B and the collateral
consequence is a reduction in utility for R and P. The loss for R is especially large because the
planner is still letting B gamble so the run risk is not completely eliminated and when a run occurs
it is disastrous for R.
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Table 10: % Change in R’s Welfare: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 -4.30% -4.28% -4.26% -3.82% 2.20% 2.24% 2.28% 2.34%
0.200 -4.37% -4.35% -4.32% 2.26% 2.23% 2.30% 2.34% -
0.300 -4.44% -4.42% -4.25% 2.23% 2.31% 2.35% - -
wP 0.400 -4.52% -4.49% 2.23% 2.33% 2.34% - - -
0.500 -4.60% 2.22% 2.34% 2.31% - - - -
0.600 2.22% 2.34% 2.24% - - - - -
0.700 2.24% 2.06% - - - - - -
0.800 1.53% - - - - - - -
Table 11: % Change in B’s Welfare: Constrained Planner vs. Competitive Equilibrium
wR
0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700 0.800
0.100 9.11% 9.11% 9.11% 8.78% 1.90% 1.84% 1.68% 1.32%
0.200 9.09% 9.10% 9.10% 1.91% 1.84% 1.61% 1.21% -
0.300 9.06% 9.07% 8.97% 1.85% 1.52% 1.07% - -
wP 0.400 9.02% 9.03% 1.85% 1.41% 0.87% - - -
0.500 8.97% 1.86% 1.24% 0.63% - - - -
0.600 1.87% 0.99% 0.20% - - - - -
0.700 0.57% -0.45% - - - - - -
0.800 -1.59% - - - - - - -
4 Regulation
We now explore how the planner’s solution can be decentralizing via various regulatory interven-
tions. Section 4.1 discusses the effects when the tools are used in isolation. In the interest of space,
we perform comparative statics with respect to these options and show their effect on selected vari-
ables in order to highlight explain the main effects of the different tools. Section 4.2 discusses how
they regulations can be optimally combined the bring the regulated economy closer to the planner’s
solution.25 We will see that a critical distinction is whether the competitive equilibrium exhibits
over-investment and under-investment. Different tools are needed in for these cases, but in either
case the best strategy requires deploying multiple regulations.
4.1 Single Regulations
We consider five regulatory tools: capital requirements, liquidity requirements, deposit insurance,
loan-to-value requirements, and a tax on dividends. We study how each tool individually affects the
25We consider a Ramsey planner who chooses the given tool optimally given the optimizing conditions and budget sets
in the competitive economy.
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two externalities in the model, i.e. how each changes the optimality condition (33) that governs the
banks’ risk-taking, and the probability of a bank run.
4.1.1 Capital Requirements
Capital regulation requires the bank to hold a certain percentage of equity for every unit of risky
loans extended, formally
CR · I ≤ EB+PBeqxReq (λCR) (52)
where CR is the capital requirement and λCR is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital constraint.26
We have written the regulation in terms of risk-weighted assets, so that there is no capital charge for
the riskless liquid asset (and we have set the risk weight on loans to be equal to one).
There are three ways that capital regulation, if is becomes a binding constraint, can influence
behavior. First, it introduces a wedge in equation (33):
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s
[
V I3s(1+ r
I)− (1+ rD3 )
]
= λCRCR
EQ
EB
> 0. (53)
So as expected, stricter capital requirements reduce the desire of the bank to take excessive risk.
This consideration pushes investment down.
From proposition 1 and budget constraints (23) and (24), we get that LIQ1 = δ ·DR and DR =
I−EQ
1−δ . Substituting these in (1), we get that
q=
(
1−δ−ξ 1−δ
1−CR
)2
. (54)
Through this second channel higher capital requirements reduce the probability of a bank-run, which
makes savers more willing to lend and the entrepreneur to borrow, which should push investment
up.
Finally, substituting equity financing for deposit financing marginally allows the bank to hold
less liquidity to serve the impatient households, which incrementally frees up resources to be in-
vested in the risky technology. Taking account of all three forces, investment in the risky project
increases for higher capital requirements.
Figure 2 shows the change in investment, the probability of a run, the deposit rate and the
repayment rate on deposits for different values of each of the regulations that we analyze. To make
this comparison across regulations, we start at the competitive equilibrium and then successively
solve the model for different levels of the each regulation (except deposit insurance which is either
on or off). The horizontal axis shows increments in the tightness of regulation, so in the case of
capital regulation each step is a 5% increase in capital (from its initial level of 14.8 percent).
The drop in the probability of a bank-run is beneficial for all agents. So the utility for each
agent rises up to the point that capital requirements are high enough to bring q down to zero (Figure
26It can be easily shown that PBeq = 1 under binding capital requirements.
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3). But, in addition to the main effect, there are other effects that are more easily identified when
the positive effects of lowering q has been exhausted. Once bank-runs are eliminated, P can only
be better-off if risky investment increases. Because capital requirements reduce the bank’s need to
carry the liquid assets, investment goes up as capital rises and deposits fall, leaving P is better-off.
B is taking excessive risks because she is protected by limited liability. Being a price taker, she
does not factor in the effect that her risk-taking has on the deposit rate. The more leverage the bank
uses in its funding, the lower is the percentage repayment on deposits, VD3b(1+ r
D) =
I
DR
V I3b(1+
rI). B neglects this in her optimal decision, but R takes it into consideration when he optimally
chooses his level of deposits (equation (16)) and insists on a higher deposit rate. Capital regulation
partially corrects this market failure, and it results in lower borrowing costs for the bank, since
with more equity deposits are better protected in bankruptcy. This consideration is why B′s welfare
improves even beyond the point that q = 0. However, as the percentage repayment on deposits in
the bankruptcy state (VD3b) gets closer to one, the positive feedback effect on the borrowing cost
diminishes and B is relatively less better-off.
In the equilibrium that we are considering, all the savings in the bank comes from R. In this case,
it immediately follows that R′s utility begins declining once capital regulation tightened beyond
what is needed to set q = 0. R could have already chosen to invest more in equity and less in
deposits and saved more or less overall. So moving him away from his initial allocation will reduce
his utility.
Capital regulation is effective in stopping a run because it forces all savers (patient and impa-
tient) to buy equity at time 1. The higher equity makes deposits safer (at both time 2 and 3). But
at time 2 this creates a subtle problem. The impatient savers will withdraw their deposits and sell
their equity. The regulation means that they will be selling more equity than otherwise, which in-
crementally pushes down the price of equity in the second period. So the patient depositors benefit
from being able to buy this equity and get a bigger capital gain than in the competitive equilibrium.
On the margin, this creates a new incentive for the patient depositors to withdraw deposits to buy
equity. Although the incentive compatibility constraint (35) is satisfied when only capital regulation
is used, the aforementioned effect can encourage patient depositors to withdraw early when capital
requirements are used in combination with other regulation which suppress long-term deposit rates
as we discuss in section 4.2.
4.1.2 Deposit Insurance
A straightforward way to eliminate the possibility of a bank-run is the introduction of full deposit
insurance. This resolves the coordination problem among patient depositors, who instead of running
would rather keep their deposits in the bank and be repaid with whatever is available in period 3.
Deposit insurance eliminates the bad equilibrium, and in the original Diamond-Dybvig set-up this
is a powerful regulation that unambiguously improve outcomes.27
27Contrary to deposit insurance, a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) is not always able to eliminate the bad equilibrium.
Credible commitment requires that any liquidity assistance that is provided be fully collateralized by the value of the
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In our model deposit insurance has two downsides that are absent from the original Diamond-
Dybvig model. One is that there can still be losses on deposits in the bad state of nature. This means
that taxes will need to be levied to repay depositors in these cases. For simplicity, we assume that
the planner levies lump-sum taxes on patient savers to pay for the deposit insurance. The lump-sum
taxes are equal to the loss given default on deposits, i.e. T3b = (1− δ)DR(1+ rD3 )−V I3bI(1+ rI)−
LIQ2. Because the tax is lump-sum and independent of whether savers hold deposits or not, the tax
does not affect the pricing of deposits. Instead, the savers act as if deposits are risk-free. Thus, R′s
optimality condition (16) becomes −λR1 +λR,i,no-run2 +(1+ rD3 )∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s = 0, i.e. R ignores the
fact that bank will default in state 3b.
This leads to the second problem associated with deposit insurance. The market discipline that
R was previously exerting through higher interest rates vanishes, so the cost of deposits for B falls,
which gives B an even stronger incentive to take additional risk and exploit limited liability. Thus,
deposit insurance eliminates the bank run, but does not correct for the risk-taking externality. 28
Not surprisingly, B substitutes towards more deposit financing (notice that the capital adequacy
ratio in Figure 2 falls) and increased lending which leads to more investment (Figure 2). Because
the bank needs to hold more liquid assets to serve early withdrawals and its liquidity ratio increases.
Eliminating the bank-run is Pareto improving. Figure 3 shows that welfare goes up for all
agents once deposit insurance is introduced. However, gains are not equally distributed. The easiest
way to see the marginal effects of deposit insurance is to compare its effect to the economy where
capital requirements are just high enough eliminate the risk of a run. Relative to this benchmark,
R is relatively better-off under capital regulation, because he does not price-in the cost of deposit
insurance. In contrast, B is relatively better-off under deposit insurance, because she can better
exploit limited liability and the option to default. P′s welfare will depend on the level of investment,
since in this comparison the probability of a run is zero under either policy. Investment is higher
under deposit insurance than with capital requirements, because the bank gambles by making extra
loans. In particular, deposit insurance results in a 10.5% increase in investment compared to the
competitive equilibrium, while a capital requirement which sets q= 0 results in a 9.2% increase.
bank’s assets in the worst possible realization in period 3. But, there is nothing that guarantees that there are sufficient
resources to permit this and in the calibrated equilibrium we examine this condition is not satisfied, thus we do not
consider a LOLR in our analysis (see Rochet and Vives (2004)). We also do not study the effects of suspension of
convertibility. Ennis and Keister (2009) show that deposit freezes, which are ex-post efficient, do not eliminate the
possibility of a bank-run.
28Admati et al. (2012) also consider a model where government guarantees exacerbate the incentive of banks to increase
their leverage and take risk. We discuss later how deposit insurance and higher capital requirement can be optimally
combined to achieve certain planning outcomes. Cooper and Ross (2002) argue that a combination of deposit insurance
and capital requirements is desirable because it simultaneously eliminates bank runs and corrects the distorted incentives
for risk-shifting. Their analysis abstracts from the general equilibrium effects of these two polices on the deposit rate and
the saving decision to smooth intertemporal consumption. This is a powerful channel which suppresses deposit rates and
can allow the bank to take on more risk.
31
4.1.3 Liquidity Regulation
The bank in the competitive equilibrium invests in safe assets only to satisfy early deposit with-
drawals. From proposition 1, LIQ1 = δ ·DR and LIQ2 = 0. This is privately optimal because when
the bank in making its asset allocation it worries only about the rates of return on assets in the
good and medium states. The marginal cost of funds is perceived as the deposit rate which exceeds
the return on the safe asset, making the safe asset an inferior investment option. However, higher
liquidity can reduce the probability of a bank-run, which the bank does not internalize.
Define the liquidity regulation as a constraint that requires
LIQ1 ≥ LR · I (λLR), (55)
where LR is the liquidity requirement and λLR is the Lagrange multiplier on the liquidity constraint.
Substituting equation (24) in (1) and using (55) we get that
q=
(
1−δ 1+ξ
1
LR
1− LIQ2LIQ1
)2
. (56)
Thus, liquidity regulation can reduce the probability of a bank-run only if it induces positive liquid-
ity holdings in period 2 after the withdrawals by the impatient depositors have occurred. This result
should not be surprising: The social benefits of holding safe asset only are present when the bank
holds enough liquid assets to raise the liquidation value of the bank in the bad state. If the bank’s
liquid asset holdings are only sufficient to cover the expected second period withdrawals, then the
liquidation value of the bank in the bad state is unaffected.
Combining the first order conditions for LIQ1, LIQ2 and DR under binding liquidity regulation,
the bank will hold positive liquidity in period 2 if
λLR ≥ (1−δ)rD E
B
EQ ∑s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s , (57)
which is satisfied for sufficiently high liquidity regulation.
There are two opposing forces with respect to the effect of liquidity regulation on risk-taking
incentives. On one hand, the bank has to hold more liquidity per unit of risky investment which
makes investment more expensive and less attractive. On the other hand, higher levels of liquid
asset holdings make it possible to attract more deposit financing, which raises the temptation to
gamble. Equation (33) becomes
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s
[
V I3s(1+ r
I)− (1+ rD3 )
]
= λLR
(
LR− δ
1−δ
)
EQ
EB
, (58)
which is positive for high enough LR.
Besides trying to reduce the probability of a bank-run, the other motivation for liquidity reg-
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ulation is to limit the losses from default that are induced by B′s excessive lending. With limited
liability the bank fails to internalize actions that make deposits safer. Liquidity regulation helps
combat this problem by directly altering B′s asset mix. When forced to hold liquid assets in place of
loans, the bank perceives its return on assets to have fallen. But, because the bank ignores the corre-
sponding drop in the cost of its deposit funding, it will seek a higher return on loans to compensate
for the lower yield on the safe asset. With the decreasing returns to scale technology operated by
P, this requires a smaller loan. So liquidity regulation leads to a first-order reduction in lending and
investment as seen in Figure 2. In the figure, the increments to liquidity on the horizontal axis are
0.5%.
The imposition of liquidity regulation has asymmetric effects on the different agents. Assuming
that the increase in liquidity requirements is sufficiently high, the reduction in the probability of
a bank-run helps P. But the large drop in investment makes P worse off. Overall, P is slightly
worse-off (Figure 3).
Liquidity regulation reduces the ability of B to take advantage of her limited liability, but can
also helps her by lowering the bank-run probability. An initial increase in the liquidity requirement
does not reduce the probability of a bank-run, because the bank continues to choose LIQ2 = 0. As
discussed in section 3.3, B could conceivably be better-off if the gap between the deposit rate and
the lending rate widened sufficiently. But, liquidity regulation by itself cannot induce this kind of
change in the intermediation spread, because the bank increases it demand for deposits and is willing
to pay a higher deposit rate. The fact that deposits are also safer works in the opposite direction
and the deposit rate remains roughly unchanged (Figure 2). Thus, B′s welfare initially drops. As
liquidity requirements becomes stricter, the bank starts holding positive liquidity in period 2 and the
probability of a bank-run drops. This raises B′s welfare, but even so it remains lower than in the
competitive equilibrium when it can gamble relatively more.
R is better off than without the regulation. The improvement comes because the size of the
default that he faces in the bad state is meaningfully reduced and because the probability of a bank-
run decreases. The only way that R previously was able to hedge this risk was by demanding a
higher interest rate on deposits, which imperfectly corrects the problem. Given the ability to now
re-optimize his mix of deposits and equity, he chooses more deposits and less equity and is strictly
better off than before.29
4.1.4 Tax on Dividends
We next consider a tax on dividends. Viewed independently this tool makes little sense because it
does not help correct the two externalities in the model. However, we will see subsequently that
when it is used in conjunction with other regulations, it can be a valuable addition to the regulatory
toolkit.
29Liquidity requirements increase the amount of investment in the liquid asset, which will serve early deposit with-
drawals at t=2, and correspondingly reduce the amount of investment in the risky asset. All else equal, this helps the early
consumers. See Fahri et al. (2009) for a Diamond-Dybvig framework with private markets in the interim period, where
liquidity requirements improve liquidity provision and increase ex-ante welfare of depositors.
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We consider a tax policy that only distorts the marginal value of holding equity. We assume that
tax revenues are returned lump-sum to shareholders in proportion to the number of shares that each
owns.
The budget constraint (13) of R in state 3s is written
cR,p,no-run3s ≤ xRsecDPS3s (1− τDiv)+VD3sDR(1+ r¯D)+LIQR2 +TR3s (λR,p,no-run3s ), (59)
where τDiv is the marginal tax on dividends and TR3s = τDivx
R
secDPS3s. The optimizing condition with
respect to equity purchases in the secondary market becomes
−λR,p,no-run2 Psec+(1− τDiv)∑
s
λR,p,no-run3s DPS3s = 0. (60)
Dividend taxes reduce the price of equity in the secondary market and thus reduce the initial will-
ingness of R buy bank equity(through equation (30)). As a result, R shifts towards saving more via
deposits and this pushes the deposit rate down. The increased supply of deposits, combined with the
lower deposit rate, allows B to take further advantage of her limited liability. This happens because
the dividend tax does not affect the marginal incentive to take risk. The budget constraint of B in
state 3s becomes
cB,no-run3s ≤
EB
EQ
max
[
V I3sI(1+ r
I)+LIQ2−
(
(1−δ)DR)(1+ rD3 ),0](1− τDiv)+TB3s+eB3s (λB,no-run3s ),
where TB3s = τDivE
BDPS3s and the equilibrium condition for the intermediation spread (33) is the
same.
R is clearly worse-off, because he is induced to save through deposits and the deposit rate falls
(Figure (3)). So R′s total savings decline. P is worse-off because dividend taxes do not address the
bank-run externality and the lower savings by R supports lower investment. B raises more deposits
and hence holds more liquidity, and is better-off for several reasons. Her ability to take risk is not
reduced. The spread between the borrowing and lending rate widens, and she gets a higher portion
of the profits. So viewed in isolation this is not a particularly attractive regulation.
4.1.5 Loan-to-Value Regulation
Finally, we consider a restriction on P′s ability to take risk that imposes a minimum loan down-
payment. Such regulation can be written as
I
I+ IP
≤ LTV
IP ≥ 1−LTV
LTV
I (λLTV ), (61)
where LTV ≤ 1 is the loan-to-value requirement and λLTV is the Lagrange multiplier on the regula-
tory constraint. In the unconstrained competitive equilibrium, P borrows the full amount needed to
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fund the project, so IP = 0 and LTV = 1. A lower LTV introduces a wedge between the marginal
productivity of investment and the loan rate. The adjusted optimality condition for I becomes:
A3gF ′
[(
1+
1−LTV
LTV
)
I
]
− (1+ rI)= λLTV
λP,no-run3g
1−LTV
LTV
. (62)
This kind of regulation also interferes with P′s ability to smooth consumption. The new optimality
condition (8) when the LTV ratio is binding is:
λP1 = aA3g
[(
1+
1−LTV
LTV
)
I
]a−1
λP,no-run3g +ξ ·∑
s
λP,run3s +λ
LTV . (63)
Loan-to-value regulation increases the percentage repayment on loan in states 3m and 3b where
P chooses to default (V I3m andV
I
3b). The bank ignores effect onV
I
3b (when it also defaults), but it will
account for the increase in V I3m and offer a lower loan rate r
I . With a lower borrowing cost P would
like to take more risk, but the binding LTV requirements force him to take a smaller loan (Figure
(2)).30
The LTV regulation create several opposing incentives for the bank and the saver. Forcing P to
have some skin in the game, makes deposits safer in the bad state and equity returns higher in the
medium state. In this calibration, R responds by shifting toward saving more with deposits.
The bank finds itself with lower loan demand and a higher supply of deposits. It responds to
these changes by reducing loans, and raising its investment in the safe asset (see Figure (2)). But
the bank does not get to the point where it carries liquid assets into period 3, i.e. LIQ2 is still zero.
Consequently, the probability of a bank-run goes up (see section 4.1.3).
Taking account of all the effects, R is worse-off (Figure (3)). B is also worse-off because her
ability to take risk is reduced and q is higher, despite the fact that her equity is less risky conditional
on bank survival. Finally, P is worse-off because he is required to reduce his consumption in the
initial period where he is poor. So even though this regulation does attack the risk-taking externality,
it does not help any of the agents when it is used alone.
4.2 Optimal Regulatory Mix
Recall that the social planner had three very different approaches to improving on the competitive
equilibrium which differed according to the weights in the social welfare function. This tells us that
any attempt to implement the social planner’s allocations using regulation will also involve different
regulatory tools depending on the weights in the social welfare function. To see this concretely, we
first consider six points in the grid that correspond to different types of allocations that the planner
might want to implement, and then share some general remarks.
First, take a case like wP = wR = 0.2 and wB = 0.6, where the planner is mostly concerned with
the welfare of the bank. In these scenarios, we saw that the planner chooses higher liquidity which
30In figure 3, each increment to the LTV represents a 0.05% decrease.
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reduces the probability of a bank-run, without reigning in the bank’s ability to gamble. Columns
two to four in Table 12 shows the key variables and utility levels for the competitive equilibrium, the
constrained social planner, and for the best outcome (in terms of social welfare) that is achievable
when the planner can only adjust liquidity regulation. We see that using liquidity regulation alone
the planner can improve upon the competitive equilibrium, but cannot completely implement the
allocations that maximize social welfare.
The failure to replicate the planner’s preferred allocations comes because the bank’s capital ratio
actually goes up which limits the bank’s ability to gamble. So bank ends up being barely worse
off relative to the competitive equilibrium. The only way to approximate the planning outcome,
therefore, is to combine the liquidity regulation with other regulations that help the bank.
Table 12: Optimal Regulation for wP = wR = 0.2, wB = 0.6
Competitive Constrained Liquidity Optimal
Equilibrium Planner Regulation Mix
I 2.548 1.587 1.776 1.587
DR 2.715 2.981 2.869 2.981
xReq 0.176 0.000 0.098 0.000
LIQ1 0.543 1.594 1.391 1.594
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.626 0.587 0.626
rd 0.570 0.047 0.526 0.047
q 0.109 0.040 0.042 0.040
CR 0.148 0.126 0.168 0.126
LR 0.213 1.004 0.783 1.004
τDiv - - - 0.358
τLIQ - - - 0.018
UP -1.697 -1.709 -1.701 -1.709
UR -0.206 -0.215 -0.202 -0.215
UB -1.834 -1.667 -1.835 -1.667
U sp -1.000 -0.956 -0.997 -0.956
There are several ways that this can be done. The planner’s allocation maximizes the bank’s
leverage, while setting the deposit rate such that the incentive compatibility constraint (35) is sat-
isfied. To increase leverage, a tax on dividends can be imposed. As described in section 4.1.4,
this tax is not redistributive, but just makes equity investment less attractive. But, if we impose a
stiff enough dividend tax to stop the saver from buying bank equity, the saver also concludes that
deposits are unattractive relative to investing directly in the liquid asset.
To replicate exactly the planner’s allocations, a tax on the safe asset can be added to the mix.31
This makes the effective return on owning the liquid asset negative, which stops the saver from
using that asset. The bank will still buy this asset provided the after-tax return remains higher than
can be obtained from making loans and liquidating them early. The last column in Table 12 shows
the results when a small tax on safe assets, along with a tax on dividends are combined with the
liquidity regulation. Using all these regulations we can mimic the planning allocations.
31The tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to the respective agents taxed within the same period and state of the
world.
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Consider next a case where the planner cares almost as much about each of the agents, such as
when wP =wR = 0.35 and wB = 0.3. In this case, and others in the blue region region in Table 3, the
planner chooses to reduce the probability of a bank-run with more capital. In the blue region, the
planner chooses lower investment than in the competitive equilibrium. Columns 2 to 4 in Table 13
show the competitive equilibrium, the constrained social planner’s allocations and the equilibrium
with the optimal choice when only a capital requirement can be implemented.
Table 13: Optimal Regulation for wP = wR = 0.35, wB = 0.3
Competitive Constrained Capital Optimal Alternative
Equilibrium Planner Regulation Mix Mix
I 2.548 2.481 2.782 2.486 2.489
DR 2.715 1.577 1.739 1.554 1.557
xReq 0.176 1.019 1.191 1.043 1.615
LIQ1 0.543 0.316 0.348 0.311 0.311
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rd 0.570 0.080 0.464 0.079 0.132
q 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CR 0.148 0.491 0.500 0.500 0.500
LR 0.213 0.127 0.125 0.125 0.125
τDiv - - - 0.505 0.481
τLIQ - - - 0.569 0.500
UP -1.697 -1.664 -1.656 -1.664 -1.664
UR -0.206 -0.201 -0.201 -0.201 -0.200
UB -1.834 -1.800 -1.825 -1.801 -1.836
U sp -1.000 -0.980 -0.982 -0.980 -0.983
With capital requirements as the single regulatory tool, the optimal choice brings the probability
of a bank-run down to zero, but resulting investment is higher than what the constrained planner
would choose.32 So although capital regulation makes each agent better off than in the competitive
equilibrium, it does not get all the way to the planner’s allocations.
A direct way to bring investment down while controlling for the bank-run is to combine capital
regulation with a tax on dividends. These two tools interact well. The capital requirement can be
used to eliminate the bank-run. The dividend tax starves the bank of equity financing, but because of
the binding capital requirement, the bank cannot freely replace equity finance with deposit financing.
When the level of these two tools are set optimally the bank cannot gamble excessively and lending
and investment must fall. However, the combination of capital requirements with a tax on dividends
pushes down both the long-run deposit rate and the equity price in the secondary market. As a result,
the incentive of patient depositors to withdraw early increases and additional policy interventions
are needed to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (35) while keeping the long-term rate
and investment low.
32The optimal level of capital requirement depends on the liquidation value of the risky investment. From equation (54)
and for LIQ2 = 0, the capital requirement that brings the probability of a bank-run down to zero is equal to 1− ξ. This
applies for any functional form for q as the probability of being served during a run is equal to 1. Capital requirement are
sufficient to control the probability of a bank-run in this environment.
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A direct way to reduce the incentives for withdrawing is to impose a tax on liquid asset holdings,
which makes equity purchases in the secondary market more attractive than saving through the
liquid asset and raises secondary equity prices. The equilibrium allocations for the optimal mix of
capital requirements, dividend tax and tax on liquid assets held by R, which are reported in column
4 of table 13, mimic the social planner’s solution for this set of weights. Broadening the policy
mix, to impose a global tax on liquid assets held by the bank as well does not perform as efficiently.
First, the tax cannot exceed the liquidation cost, 1−ξ, of long-term investment, otherwise the bank
would not hold liquid assets to satisfy early withdrawals by impatient depositors. The fifth column
in table 13 reports the equilibrium allocation when a tax on liquid assets of 50%(= 1−ξ) is imposed
globally. Such a policy induces the bank to issue equity at a discount, since holding liquidity to meet
early withdrawals in costly on the margin, and the equity price in the initial period falls (PBeq = 0.65).
Although risky investment falls, as intended, the welfare losses to B outweigh the gains to R and
social welfare is lower than in the case that capital requirement are the only policy chosen optimally.
The analysis above highlights the difficulties in suppressing investment while controlling for the
run with higher capital requirements. An alternative way to reduce the amount of risky investment
would be to supplement capital requirements with liquidity requirements. Capital requirement can
be optimally chosen to eliminate the possibility of a run, while liquidity requirement would act as
a “tax" on risky investment given that bank should hold more inefficient liquid assets. However,
such a combination results in lower social welfare compared to the use of only capital requirements
for wP = wR = 0.35 considered above (see Figure 4 in Appendix B). This is not surprising since
liquidity regulation hurts P and B while the gains to R are limited (see section 4.1.3).
However, the combination of capital and liquidity requirements can increase welfare when the
planner cares mostly about R. For instance, consider another combination in the blue region where
wP = 0.2, wR = 0.6 and wB = 0.2. Table 14 compares the equilibrium allocations when, first, the
optimal mix of capital requirements, dividend tax and tax on liquid assets held by R, and, second,
capital and liquidity requirement, are implemented. Both result in lower investment than the com-
petitive equilibrium while setting the probability of a bank-run to zero, though the latter induce a
smaller increase in welfare.33
Next consider the green region in Table 3. Throughout the green region, the planner controls
the bank-run with higher capital, but chooses higher investment than in the competitive equilibrium.
One example is when wP = wR = 0.4 and wB = 0.2. Table 15 shows the various possible outcomes
for these social welfare weights, which are in line to the ones obtained for the blue region when a
combination of capital requirements, dividend tax and tax on liquid assets are used; all that changes
is the optimal dividend tax and the tax on liquid assets held by R are lower. In particular, the lower
dividend tax allows the bank to attract enough funding to boost its lending.
As the level of investment that the planner targets increases, the importance of the tax on liquid
assets diminishes. The reason is that higher levels of investment can be implemented with a smaller
33The combination of capital and liquidity regulation also increases social welfare and reduces investment for
(wP,wR) ∈ {(0.1,0.5),(0.1,0.6),(0.1,0.7),(0.2,0.5)}, which correspond to the blue region.
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Table 14: Optimal Regulation for wP = 0.2,wR = 0.6, wB = 0.2
Competitive Constrained Capital Optimal Capital & Liquidity
Equilibrium Planner Regulation Mix Regulation
I 2.548 2.536 2.782 2.536 2.435
DR 2.715 1.585 1.739 1.585 1.936
xReq 0.176 1.068 1.191 1.068 1.017
LIQ1 0.543 0.317 0.348 0.317 0.718
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.461
rd 0.570 0.137 0.464 0.137 0.473
q 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CR 0.148 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
LR 0.213 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.295
τDiv - - - 0.439 0.000
τLIQ - - - 0.487 0.000
UP -1.697 -1.663 -1.656 -1.663 -1.666
UR -0.206 -0.201 -0.201 -0.201 -0.200
UB -1.834 -1.805 -1.825 -1.805 -1.825
U sp -1.000 -0.979 -0.982 -0.979 -0.980
tax on dividends and after a point the patient savers’ incentive compatibility constraint will not bind.
Thus, there is not a need to discourage them from holding liquid assets. For example, consider the
planner’s solution for wP = 0.6, wR = 0.2 and wB = 0.2 reported in table 16. The planner chooses
higher investment compared to the competitive equilibrium, yet lower than what can be achieved
with optimal capital regulation. A smaller tax of dividends can complement capital requirements to
bring investment down to the desired level, while satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint.
Thus, there is no need to levy a tax on liquid assets to replicate the planner’s solution.34
Finally, there are other portions of the green region where the dividend tax is not the best tool
to combine with capital regulation to approximate the planner’s allocations. These situations arise
when the weight on P is relatively high and the weight on B is relatively low. In these cases, the
planner not only sets investment higher than in the competitive equilibrium, but also higher than the
level that results when capital requirements have been used to eliminate a bank-run. One example
where this happens is when social planner’s weights are wP = 0.6, wR = 0.3 and wB = 0.1 (Table
17).
To further boost investment once the run risk is absent, the bank’s balance sheet must grow. That
cannot happen when a dividend tax is implemented. Instead, a subsidy for equity investment would
be required – which we rule out as implausible. However, higher investment could be achieved by
a combination of capital requirements and deposit insurance. With deposit insurance, the cost of
deposits falls and this makes it possible for the bank to raise additional equity so that investment
can expand. With deposit insurance on top of capital requirement, B and P are the marginal winners
since B can exploit better her limited liability and P receives a bigger loan. R loses on the margin
because he has to pay for the deposit insurance that is needed to achieve the desired level of risk-
taking.
34This combination is also optimal for (wP,wR) ∈ {(0.3,0.6),(0.4,0.5)}, which correspond to the green region.
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Table 15: Optimal Regulation for wP = wR = 0.4, wB = 0.2
Competitive Constrained Capital Optimal
Equilibrium Planner Regulation Mix
I 2.548 2.587 2.782 2.587
DR 2.715 1.617 1.739 1.617
xReq 0.176 1.093 1.191 1.093
LIQ1 0.543 0.323 0.348 0.323
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rd 0.570 0.199 0.464 0.199
q 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000
CR 0.148 0.500 0.500 0.500
LR 0.213 0.125 0.125 0.125
τDiv - - - 0.381
τLIQ - - - 0.456
UP -1.697 -1.661 -1.656 -1.661
UR -0.206 -0.201 -0.201 -0.201
UB -1.834 -1.808 -1.825 -1.808
U sp -1.000 -0.980 -0.982 -0.980
Rather than focusing on the details of the exact combinations of regulations that appear opti-
mal, we think it is more important to recognize several generic implications of the analysis. First,
regardless of which weights the planner places on the different agents, approximating the plan-
ner’s allocations with just one regulation is impossible. In this model, it takes at least two tools to
overcome the various distortions.
Second, the way that the various regulations change behavior is very different. So combining
some of them leads to very little improvement. Put differently, it is not correct to conclude that
combining any two tools is necessarily enough to correct the two externalities in the model.
Third, the interactions among the regulations are sufficiently subtle that it would be hard to
guess which combinations prove to be optimal in this model. We do not want to claim that our
model is sufficiently general that the findings necessarily would carry over to all other models. But,
attempting to assess different regulations (and to calibrate how they should be set) would be very
difficult to do without consulting a range of models. Intuition helps, but at some point it runs out. 35
Fourth, the main substance challenge arises for the blue region of the parameter space, where the
planner would like to eliminate runs and shrink investment. Finding combinations of the regulatory
tools that can deliver this outcome is hard for very intuitive reasons. These are all cases where the
planner cares more about the savers and borrowers than the banks, so that raising capital standards
is the best way to control the run. But, as we have seen higher capital standards on their own lead to
higher investment. Introducing deposit insurance makes this problem even worse. Adding liquidity
regulation can lead to lower investment, but it can only happen if the required level of liquidity is
35Multiple externalities operating through different channels would generally require multiple tools to be addressed.
In this paper we address the externalities arising from bank-runs and excessive risk-taking. Other type of externalities,
for example, can stem from the possibility of fire-sales within the financial system. See Stein (2012), Korinek (2011) and
Goodhart et al. (2013) for models which exhibit fire-sales externalities. The latter shows that multiple tools should be
used to tackle the inefficiencies within the financial system.
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Table 16: Optimal Regulation for wP = 0.6, wR = 0.2, wB = 0.2
Competitive Constrained Capital Optimal
Equilibrium Planner Regulation Mix
I 2.548 2.684 2.782 2.699
DR 2.715 1.678 1.739 1.687
xReq 0.176 1.142 1.191 1.150
LIQ1 0.543 0.336 0.348 0.337
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rd 0.570 0.324 0.464 0.344
q 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000
CR 0.148 0.500 0.500 0.500
LR 0.213 0.125 0.125 0.125
τDiv - - - 0.141
τLIQ - - - 0.000
UP -1.697 -1.659 -1.656 -1.658
UR -0.206 -0.201 -0.201 -0.201
UB -1.834 -1.816 -1.825 -1.817
U sp -1.000 -0.980 -0.982 -0.980
high. In those situations the low relative return on liquid assets greatly reduces the services offered
by the bank and social welfare suffers. Likewise, loan to value regulation can be used to shrink
investment, but that severely penalizes the borrower and also reduces social welfare.
These considerations lead to using taxes as the second tool with capital regulation. As we
described already, dividend taxes make it difficult to keep the patient depositors from withdrawing
their money to buy the equity that the impatient investors sell. While taxes on liquid assets can be
used to approximate the planner’s solution these interventions do not seem very realistic and must
be targeted to hit only savers and not intermediaries to be fully effective.
The bottom-line is that if we think excessive gambling and run-risk are the primary considera-
tions that the planner is trying to deal with, the usual regulatory tools do not look like good choices
for achieving this outcome. Of course, this statement is conditional on the exact benchmark equilib-
rium which we consider and need not be generically true. But there are good reasons to think that
this objective is likely to be challenging.
5 Conclusions
We have examined how many regulations that are often discussed in policy discussions fare in a
relatively familiar model of banking. We started from the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) benchmark
precisely because it is so thoroughly studied. The modifications that we made trade-off tractability
to keep the model relatively simple, against our preference for expanding it to include forces that
we believe were important in the global financial crisis.
Therefore, our model includes not only an incentive for lenders and borrowers to take excessive
risks, but also the risk of a funding run. This simple pair of features interact in interesting and
unexpected ways. We draw several very general lessons from the model that we believe will carry
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Table 17: Optimal Regulation for wP = 0.6, wR = 0.3, wB = 0.1
Competitive Constrained Capital Capital regulation
Equilibrium Planner Regulation & Deposit Insurance
I 2.548 2.848 2.782 2.896
DR 2.715 1.780 1.739 1.810
xReq 0.176 1.224 1.191 1.248
LIQ1 0.543 0.356 0.348 0.362
LIQ2/LIQ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rd 0.570 0.557 0.464 0.307
q 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000
CR 0.148 0.500 0.500 0.500
LR 0.213 0.125 0.125 0.125
UP -1.697 -1.655 -1.656 -1.654
UR -0.206 -0.201 -0.201 -0.202
UB -1.834 -1.830 -1.825 -1.819
U sp -1.000 -0.978 -0.982 -0.978
over to many other models.
First, the unconstrained competitive equilibrium that emerges when private agents do what is in-
dividually optimal leads is inefficient. We found many regulatory interventions that made everyone
in the economy better off (than they would be in the absence of regulations).
Second, the reason why regulations can lead to Pareto improvements is because of the destruc-
tive nature of bank runs. A run hurts savers who may lose deposits, intermediaries that might be
wiped out inadvertently, and borrowers who lose credit. Consequently, interventions that reduce
the run risk can make everyone better off. But, the policies we found that can prevent runs will
differentially favor borrowers, savers and the owners of intermediaries.
Third, taming excessive risk-taking is a trickier problem. The agents that are gambling will not
voluntarily want to give up doing so. This makes it unlikely that there will be unanimous support
for reigning in the excessive risk-taking.
Fourth, these previous two points suggest that political economy aspects of regulatory design
deserve much more study. Discussing financial regulation in models that preclude default is not
very interesting. If default was not a fundamental problem, contracts would take care of it, and it
would not be such a pervasive feature of the world. Once we recognize that markets are sufficiently
incomplete so that default is unavoidable, then it follows that welfare analysis necessarily becomes
complicated. A social planner has to put weights on different actors in the model to determine the
best allocations. But, where do these weights come from? The gains from lobbying (and other
actions) that can determine which regulations are chosen are likely to be high.
A corollary to this observation is that the incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage is also
strong. The incidence of some regulations is very different. If some agents cannot win the political
battle to prevent the regulations to being enacted in the first place, then the next step is to try to evade
them. The lack of regulatory arbitrage in the model we have studied is one of its main shortcomings.
More generally, we think the kind of analysis that is needed to make additional progress on
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these issues depends on having two ingredients. First, any plausible model has to be cast in a
general equilibrium framework. The environment we explored shows that there are many feedback
mechanisms that link different agents and shape the efficacy of different regulations.
Second, the model also must include agents that are forward looking. It is precisely because
agents can anticipate some of the effects of different restrictions that they will take defensive actions.
It is these defensive actions that lead to the feedback mechanisms that must be understood.
Finally, all of the specific conclusions that we have reached about how regulations interact need
to be verified in other models. One appealing feature of the model in this paper is that it presumes
that the financial system serves multiple purposes. Our bank benefits the borrowers and lenders by
facilitating risk-sharing, extending credit, and providing liquidity. We think that shutting down any
of these features could create misleading impressions about the effectiveness of different regula-
tions. So including all three of these roles for the financial system in future models is important.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using (32), the fact that VD2s = 1 for s /∈ sD and that ψB1 = ψB2 , the optimality condition for
holding the liquid asset in the bank’s balance sheet from period 2 to period 3 (LIQB2 ) is
−ψB1 +
EB+ xBeq
EB+ xBeq+ xReq
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s =−ψB1 +
ψB1
1+ rD
< 0
since rD is strictly greater then zero from R’s optimality condition (16), VD2s < 1 for s
D and R has an
outside option of investing in the riskless asset.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let, for the sake of simplicity, rD2 = 0. The optimality condition for D
B is:
−λB1 +ψB1 −
EB+ xBeq
EB+ xBeq+ xReq
∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s (1+ r
D
3 )+∑
s
λB,no-run3s V
D
3s(1+ r
D
3 )+∑
s
λB,run,paid3s ≤ 0 (64)
If (64) is zero then DB > 0, while if it is negative DB = 0 (short-selling of deposits is not allowed).
Substituting (32) in (64) we get:
−λB1 +∑
s
λB,no-run3s V
D
3s(1+ r
D
3 )+∑
s
λB,run,paid3s ≤ 0 (65)
Let EQ= EB+xBeq+x
R
eq be the total equity in the bank, which is also the number of share given
that PBeq = 1. The optimality condition with respect to x
B
eq is:
−λB1 +ψB1 +
xReq
EQ ∑s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s DPS2s =
−λB1 + ∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s (1+ r
D)≤
−∑
s
λB,run,paid3s −∑
s
λB,no-run3s V
D
3s(1+ r
D
3 )+ ∑
s/∈sD
λB,no-run3s (1+ r
D)< 0 (66)
using equations (32), (30) and (65).Thus, xBeq = 0.
Proposition 3: P does not issue equity claims on the output of the risky project when V I3g = 1 and
V I3m,V
I
3b < 1 and x
R
eq > 0.
Proof. We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that P is willing to issue y shares at the price
p per share and that his own contribution is IP equally divided into the same amount of shares with
nominal price 1. The payoff from the project to the entrepreneur in state 3g, if his project is not
liquidated early, is
IP
IP+ y
[A2gF(I+ IP+ p · y)− I(1+ rI)]. Conditional on a bank-run the payoff P
receives from her equity investment is ξ · (IP+ p · y) I
P
IP+ y
. The optimality condition for y is, thus,
λP,no-run3g [−
IP
(Ip+ y)2
A2g(I+IP+ p ·y)a+ I
P
IP+ y
aA2g(I+IP+ p ·y)a−1 · p]+ξ(p−1)I
P
(IP+ y)2
IP∑
s
λP,run3s =
0. Thus,
py=0 =
ξ ·∑sλP,run3s +λP,no-run3g A3g(I+ IP)a(IP)−1
ξ ·∑sλP,run3s +λP,no-run3g aA3g(I+ IP)a−1
, (67)
evaluated at y= 0 and the dividends per share are
(1−a)A3g(I+ IP)a
IP
.
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R is willing to buy equity in P′s project if
py=0 ·λR1 <
(
λR,i,no-run2 +λ
R,p,no-run
2
λR,p,no-run2
)
λR3g
(1−a)A3g(I+ IP)a
IP
+ξ ·(λR,run,paid2 +λR,run,unpaid2 ), (68)
allowing for a secondary marker where equity in the entrepreneurial firm can be traded. Using
equation (17) and (20), condition (68) can be written as
py=0 ·∑
s
λR,p.no-run3s DPS3s < λ
R
3g
(1−a)A3g(I+ IP)a
IP
+ξ · λ
R,run,paid
2 +λ
R,run,unpaid
2
λR,i,no-run2 +λ
R,p,no-run
2
. (69)
Consider the case that the probability of a bank-run is zero. Then, (67) yields py=0 =
1
a
(I+ IP)a−1
IP
and, using (69), R will invest in entrepreneurial equity if
∑
s
λR,p.no-run3s DPS3s < λ
R
3g(1−a)(1+ rI)
λR3g(1−δ)DR(rI− rD)+aλR3g(1+ rI)+EQλR3mDPS2m < 0,
which is a contradiction. Hence, R will not invest in equity. This is also true for q > 0 because
the equity investment in P becomes less profitable, as there is a positive probability that it will be
liquidated, and yields an inefficient return dominated by investment in deposits or the liquid asset.
Similarly, B is not willing to buy equity in P′s project given her optimality condition (31).
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Appendix B
Table 18: Exogenous variables
eP1 = 1.00 e
R
1 = 10.00 e
B
1 = 0.70 E
B = 0.20 ω3g = 0.50
eP3g = 1.00 e
R
2 = 4 e
B
3g = 1.50 α= 0.7 ω3m = 0.40
eP3m = 1.00 e
B
3m = 1.50 A3g = 3.30 ω3b = 0.10
eP3b = 0.40 e
B
3b = 1.50 A3m = 1.90 δ= 0.2
γP = 2.10 γR = 2.10 γB = 2.10 A3b = 0.40 ξ= 0.5
Table 19: Equilibrium variables
Financial Variables Consumption & Utilities
Limited Unlimited Limited Unlimited
Liability Liability Liability Liability
rI 0.745 0.000 cP1 1.000 0.958
rD3 0.570 0.000 c
P,no-run
3g 2.906 2.272
rD2 0.000 0.000 c
P,no-run
3m 1.000 1.602
V I3m 0.823 1.000 c
P,no-run
3b 0.400 0.284
V I3b 0.173 1.000 c
P,run
3g ,c
P,run
3m 1.000 -
VD3b 0.226 1.000 c
P,run
3m 0.400 -
I 2.548 0.308 cR1 7.109 7.000
LIQ1 0.543 0.027 c
R,i,no-run
2 6.943 7.000
LIQ2 0.000 0.000 c
R,p,no-run
3g 8.813 7.000
DR 2.715 0.134 cR,p,no-run3m 8.350 7.000
xReq 0.176 0.000 c
R,p,no-run
3b 4.905 7.000
DPS3g 2.752 1.000 c
R,run,paid
2 6.715 -
DPS3m 0.656 1.000 c
R,run,unpaid
2 4.000 -
DPS3b 0.000 0.000 cB1 0.700 0.700
CR 0.148 0.650 cB,no-run3g 2.050 1.700
LR 0.213 0.087 cB,no-run3m 1.631 1.700
θ 0.669 1.344 cB,no-run3b 1.500 1.700
q 0.109 0.000 cB,run3s 1.500 -
LIQR1 0.000 2.866 U¯
P -1.697 -1.716
LIQR2 3.943 6.866 U¯
R -0.206 -0.214
IP 0.000 0.042 U¯B -1.834 -1.853
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Figure 2: Comparative statics for single regulations: The figure shows the response of selected variables for
different levels of various regulations. The horizontal axis represents the number of successive times each
tool is tightened. The first iteration correspond to the competitive equilibrium level where the tool is not
binding (except for deposit insurance which is a binary decisions).
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for single regulations: The figure shows the change in agents’ welfare for
different levels of various regulations compared to the competitive equilibrium. The horizontal axis represents
the number of successive times each tool is tightened. The first iteration correspond to the competitive
equilibrium level where the tool is not binding (except for deposit insurance which is a binary decisions).
Figure 4: Risky investment (left) and social welfare (right) for stricter liquidity requirements under optimal
capital regulation (wP = 0.35, wR = 0.35).
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